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THE FLOOD CONTROL REGIME OF THE
COLUMBIA RIVER TREATY: BEFORE AND
AFTER 2024.
Nigel Bankes*
Abstract: This article examines the flood control rules established by the
Columbia River Treaty and Protocol between Canada and the United States
before and after 2024. The flood control operations change automatically in
2024. Part I discusses the flooding risks posed by the Columbia and Kootenay
Rivers. Part II offers an account of the general international law pertaining to
flood protection and in particular the duties that one basin state may owe to
another. This section draws on the work of the International Law Commission
which informed the adoption of the United Nations Convention on the NonNavigational Uses of International Watercourses. Part III outlines some of the
background to the negotiation of the flood control provisions of the Columbia
River Treaty (CRT) referring in particular to the work of the International
Joint Commission (IJC) established by the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909.
Part IV describes the flood control provisions of the Treaty as qualified by the
terms of the Protocol to the Treaty including both assured flood control and oncall flood control. The assured flood control provisions expire in 2024. Flood
control is principally provided by the construction of three treaty dams in
Canada (Arrow/Keenleyside, Mica and Duncan) and the operation of those
dams in accordance with a flood control operating plan (FCOP). The appendix
contains a more detailed account of the FCOP and variation of the FCOP
known as VARQ FC.
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INTRODUCTION

This article examines the flood control rules established by
the Columbia River Treaty and Protocol of 1964 (CRT or
Treaty) between Canada and the United States.1 The “before
and after” in the title of this article recognizes that the flood
control provisions of the Treaty change automatically and
significantly on the Treaty’s sixtieth anniversary in 2024.
But while the flood control rules will change, the CRT itself
will continue after 2024 unless one party gives ten years
notice of termination in 2014 or at any time thereafter. If
neither party gives notice, the Treaty will continue (but with
changed flood control rules) indefinitely (subject to the ten
year notice provision).
Canada and the United States negotiated the CRT to
cooperatively develop the Columbia Basin and to share the
resulting flood control and power benefits between the two
parties. Operations under the CRT are carried out by the
“Entities” designated by each government. The Canadian
Entity for most purposes is BC Hydro and Power Authority,
which is a Crown corporation of the province of British
Columbia.2 The U.S. Entity comprises the Division Engineer,
1. Treaty Relating to Cooperative Development of the Water Resources of the
Columbia River Basin, U.S.-Can., Jan. 17, 1961, 15 U.S.T. 1555, T.I.A.S. No. 5638
(entered into force Jan. 22 1964) [hereinafter Columbia River Treaty].
2. The province of British Columbia is the designated Entity for the purposes of
Canada’s
downstream power entitlement.
See generally
BC Hydro,
http://www.bchydro.com/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2012) (providing background
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North Pacific Division of the Army Corps of Engineers and
the Administrator of the Bonneville Power Administration
(the Department of the Interior, now the Department of
Energy).3 Given the importance of the flood control changes
that will occur in 2024 and changes to the power operation
that may occur, the two Entities have conducted joint studies
(the Phase 1 studies) to analyze and model potential changes
to power and flood control matters.4 In addition, both Entities
are carrying out their own independent analysis.5
The Entities limited the Phase 1 studies to three options.
In option one, the Treaty continues, thereby delivering
ongoing shared power benefits, but with the changed flood
control provisions contemplated by the Treaty. In option two,
the Treaty is terminated. This option terminates the shared
power benefits of the Treaty, but continues the changed flood
2012]

information relating to BC Hydro). BC Hydro’s facilities on the Columbia River
include three Treaty dams: Mica, Duncan and Keenleyside (Arrow). See Columbia,
http://www.bchydro.com/energy_in_bc/our_system/generation/our_facilities/columbia
.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2012).
3. Exchange of Notes, Sept. 16, 1964 attaching Executive Order 11177, Providing
for Certain Arrangement under the Columbia River Treaty, 542 UNTS 312. The
Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) is a federal nonprofit agency based in the
Pacific Northwest. It is part of the U.S. Department of Energy, the BPA markets
wholesale electrical power from thirty-one federal hydro projects in the Columbia
River Basin, one nonfederal nuclear plant and several other small nonfederal power
plants. The dams are operated by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the Bureau
of Reclamation. About thirty percent of the electric power used in the Northwest
comes from the BPA. See generally Bonneville Power Administration,
http://www.bpa.gov/corporate/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2012) (providing background
information relating to the BPA).
4. U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS & BONNEVILLE POWER ADMIN., COLUMBIA RIVER
TREATY 2014/2024 REVIEW: PHASE 1 REPORT (2010) [hereinafter ENTITIES PHASE I
REPORT], available at http://www.crt2014-2024review.gov/TechnicalStudies.aspx. In
addition, the U.S. Entity has prepared a supplemental report which examines the
interrelationship between changed flood control operations and operations
mandated by biological opinions issued for various species under terms of the
Endangered Species Act. See U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS & BONNEVILLE POWER
ADMIN., COLUMBIA RIVER TREATY 2014/2024 REVIEW: SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT AND
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (2010) [hereinafter U.S. ENTITY, SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT],
available at http://www.crt2014-2024review.gov/SupplementalReport.aspx.
5. In the United States this is known as the 2014/24 Columbia River Treaty
Review (or the Sovereign Review). See generally U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS &
BONNEVILLE POWER ADMIN., COLUMBIA RIVER TREATY: 2014/2024 REVIEW,
http://www.crt2014-2024review.gov/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2012). There is a similar
review process in Canada led by the province of British Columbia. See generally
BRITISH COLUMBIA MINISTRY OF ENERGY, COLUMBIA RIVER TREATY,
http://www.em.gov.bc.ca/EPD/COLUMBIARIVERTREATY/Pages/default.aspx (last
visited Mar. 20, 2012).
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control provisions (since, as we shall see below, treaty
termination has no effect on the changed flood control
provisions that kick in automatically in 2024). In option
three, the two countries would renegotiate the Treaty so as to
continue the existing assured flood control provisions (rather
than those which will automatically substitute for these
provisions in 2024). The Entities recognize that there are
significant issues beyond the basic power and flood control
scenarios examined in the Phase 1 studies. The United
States and Canada will work to hear from regional interests,
stakeholders and sovereigns to define additional scenarios for
analysis.
In Part II, this article refers briefly to the flooding risks
posed by the Columbia and Kootenay Rivers. Each of these
rivers originates in British Columbia, Canada before flowing
into the United States.6 The Kootenay is an important
tributary of the Columbia. This section also describes how
storage reservoirs may be operated to provide flood control
protection.
Part III considers the general international law pertaining
to flood protection, and in particular, the duties that one
basin state may owe to another. This section draws on the
work of the International Law Commission7 (ILC), which led
to the adoption of the United Nations Convention on the NonNavigational Uses of International Watercourses.8
Part IV outlines some of the background to the negotiation

6. For descriptions of the geography of the Basin, see NEIL SWAINSON, CONFLICT
OVER THE COLUMBIA: THE CANADIAN BACKGROUND TO AN HISTORIC TREATY 24–29
(1979); Ralph Johnson, The Canada-United States Controversy over the Columbia
River, 41 WASH. L. REV. 676, 682–84 (1966); CAN. DEP’TS OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS,
NORTHERN AFFAIRS AND NATIONAL RESOURCES, THE COLUMBIA RIVER TREATY AND
PROTOCOL: A PRESENTATION 14–16 (1964); Nigel Bankes, The Columbia Basin and
the Columbia River Treaty: Canadian Perspectives in the 1990s (1996),
http://www.law.ucalgary.ca/system/files/Columbia+River+Treaty+Lewis+%2526+Clar
k+paper+Bankes9504-1.pdf (working paper).
7. The ILC engages in both the codification and progressive development of
international law. Many of the provisions of this Convention are considered to have
the status of customary law. See Int’l Law Comm’n, Laws of Non-Navigational Uses
of Int’l Watercourses, http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/guide/.
8_3.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2012). For further discussion of the Convention, see
Part III.A. of this paper, infra.
8. United Nations Convention on the Non-Navigational Uses of International
Watercourses, May 21 1997, 36 I.L.M. 700 (1997) [hereinafter Convention], available
at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/8_3_1997.pdf.
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of the flood control provisions of the CRT referring, in
particular, to the work of the International Joint Commission
(IJC) established by the United Kingdom (for Canada) and
the United States under the terms of the Boundary Waters
Treaty of 1909.9 At the request of the two governments, the
IJC, in 1959, developed a set of Principles for Determining
and Apportioning Benefits from Cooperative Use of Storage
Waters and Electrical Interconnection within the Columbia
River System.10
Part V describes the flood control provisions of the Treaty
as they were adopted in 1961 and, as subsequently qualified
prior to ratification, by the terms of the Protocol to the
Treaty.11 The Treaty contemplated two main forms of flood
control: assured flood control (or flood control in accordance
with a prescribed flood control operating plan (FCOP)) and
on-call flood control (which allows the United States to call
upon Canada to operate additional storage on an ad hoc and
as-needed basis to provide further flood control in the United
States in very large run-off years). Both forms of flood control
are available to the United States until 2024. After that date,
2012]

9. Treaty Between the United States and Great Britain Relating to Boundary
Waters between the United States and Canada, U.S.-Can., Jan. 11, 1909, 36 Stat.
2448, available at http://www.ijc.org/rel/agree/water.html.
10. Int’l J. Comm’n, Principles for Determining and Apportioning Benefits from
Cooperative Use of Storage Waters and Electrical Interconnection within the
Columbia
River
System
(Dec.
29,
1959),
http://www.crt20142024review.gov/Files/IJC.pdf [hereinafter IJC Principles]. The IJC had done earlier
work for the two governments on project selection.
11. Exchange of Notes Constituting an Agreement between Canada and the
United States Concerning the Treaty Related to Co-Operative Development of the
Water Resources of the Columbia River Basin, Washington, 22 Jan. 1964, 542
U.N.T.S. 292. Between 1961, when the Treaty was first negotiated, and 1964, when
the instruments of ratification were exchanged, the province of British Columbia
insisted upon some changes and clarifications to the Treaty as well as the pre-sale in
the United States of the first thirty years of downstream power benefits. These
benefits accrue to the province under the terms of an agreement between Canada
and British Columbia. See Canada - British Columbia Agreement, Jan. 13, 1964,
available
at
http://www.em.gov.bc.ca/EPD/COLUMBIARIVERTREATY/Pages/
default.aspx. This assignment of benefits is also in accord with the assignment of
benefits in relation to publicly owned resources under the Constitution Act, 1867 and
the Terms of Union between British Columbia and Canada. See Constitution Act,
1867, 30 & 31 Vict., ch. 3, §109 (U.K.), reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, app. II, no. 5 (Can.).
The changes and clarifications were recorded in the Protocol. The Protocol was
attached as an Annex to the exchange of notes associated with the instrument of
ratification. It is, for all intents and purposes, part and parcel of the Treaty. See
generally Swainson, supra note 6, at ch. 9 (discussing the background of the
Protocol).
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the United States loses the assured operation and is only
entitled to an on-call or called upon flood control operation.
Flood control is provided by the construction of three Treaty
dams in Canada (Arrow/Keenleyside, Mica and Duncan) and
the operation of those dams in accordance with the FCOP. In
addition, the Treaty authorized the construction of one
upstream storage and power dam in the United States
(Libby). The Treaty also approved the storage reservoir for
Libby, Lake Koocanusa, which backs up into Canada. The
United States may also request on-call flood control
operations from other Canadian facilities such as Kootenay
Lake.
A key aim of this article is to explore two important
questions in the context of the post-2024 called-upon
operation. Both questions relate to the circumstances under
which the United States may initiate a call. The first
question relates to the volume of flow that must be expected
at The Dalles in Oregon before a call can be made. The
second question involves the proper interpretation of the
United States’ obligation to make effective use of its own
storage before it makes the call. Part VI of the paper offers
some conclusions. An appendix provides a more detailed
account of the FCOP developed by the United States Army
Corps of Engineers (Corps) for the Canadian Treaty dams,
plus Libby.12 The appendix also describes modifications to the
standard flood control approach that the Corps has developed
and applied to the Libby and Hungry Horse facilities (the socalled VARQ flood control (FC) operation).13 The Corps
adopted VARQ FC to balance the competing requirements of
flood control drafts at the projects against the demands for
reservoir levels to augment flows for fish species listed under
the U.S. Endangered Species Act.14
12. NORTH PACIFIC DIVISION, CORPS OF ENG’RS, COLUMBIA RIVER TREATY FLOOD
CONTROL OPERATING PLAN 3 (1972) [hereinafter FCOP 1972]. For the current
version, see NORTH PACIFIC DIVISION, CORPS OF ENG’RS, COLUMBIA RIVER TREATY
FLOOD CONTROL OPERATING PLAN (2003) [hereinafter FCOP 2003], available at
http://www.crt2014-2024review.gov/Files/FCOP2003.pdf.
13. For VARQ, see U.S. ARMY CORP OF ENG’RS, UPPER COLUMBIA ALTERNATIVE
FLOOD CONTROL AND FISH OPERATIONS, COLUMBIA RIVER BASIN, FINAL
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT (2006) [hereinafter VARQ FINAL EIS].
14. 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (2006); see also U.S. ENTITY, SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT, supra
note 4, at 17–18 (providing a useful summary of the Biological Opinion Operating
Requirements for the different U.S. projects on the Columbia system).

https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjelp/vol2/iss1/1

6

Bankes: The Flood Control Regime of the Columbia River Treaty: Before and

THE FLOOD CONTROL REGIME OF THE COLUMBIA
7
RIVER TREATY
It bears emphasizing that the focus of this article is
deliberately and narrowly on the flood control provisions of
the Treaty. While the Treaty distinguishes between power
and flood control operations, operations for power and flood
control will often coincide. Thus, drafting reservoirs for power
may deliver flood control benefits. The reverse (in which flood
control drives operations—i.e. the status quo)15 is also true.
While the flood control benefits change automatically in
2024, the power benefits conferred by the CRT only change in
the event that one party gives notice to terminate. Either
party may terminate the CRT by giving ten years notice
beginning in 2014.16 However, termination of the Treaty will
not alter the post-2024 flood control provisions. These
provisions will continue until the useful life of those facilities
or for as long as there is a need for flood control.17
There is an ongoing and much broader debate about the
future of the CRT, including proposals to amend the Treaty
to incorporate a broader range of values in addition to the
power and flood control values of the current treaty.18 This
article simply contributes a better understanding of the
background to, and implications of, the changing flood control
provisions as part of that broader debate.
2012]

15. ENTITIES PHASE I REPORT, supra note 4, at Appendix A (noting that in both
planning and real time operations priority is always accorded to flood control over
power, but that “the two objectives of flood control and power are often
complementary, as the evacuation and refill of reservoirs provides benefits for
both”).
16. It is possible for a party to give notice to terminate before 2014, but such notice
could not take effect before 2024. See Columbia River Treaty, supra note 1, at art.
XIX(2).
17. Note that other provisions also continue, including the provisions in relation to
Libby. Therefore, it is somewhat misleading to talk about “treaty termination.” See
Columbia River Treaty, supra note 1, at art. XIX(4).
18. See in this context Matthew McKinney et al., Managing Transboundary
Natural Resources: An Assessment of the Need to Revise and Update the Columbia
River Treaty, 16 HASTINGS W. NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 307 (2010) (discussing both
drivers of change in the Basin and options for the future); see also Barbara Cosens,
Transboundary River Governance in the Face of Uncertainty: Resilience Theory and
Columbia River Treaty, 30 J. LAND, RESOURCES AND ENVTL L. 229, 245 (2010)
(discussing the Columbia as a complex system and the drivers within the Basin to
which the Treaty needs to respond).
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II.

COLUMBIA AND KOOTENAY RIVERS: FLOOD
RISKS AND RESPONSES

The Columbia River and its tributaries do not have the
same reputation as the Missouri or the Mississippi Rivers, or
even the Red River,19 for frequent and catastrophic floods
(since the flood plains associated with these rivers are flat
and extensive), but history does record a number of major
flood events including the floods of 1894, 1948 and 1964.
Additionally, the natural variability of the Columbia far
exceeds that of many other rivers.20 Much of this variability
originates in Canada due to the large component of “snow
storage” which tends to melt in a relatively short window.
The 1894 flood produced peak flows at The Dalles of
1,240,000 cubic feet per second (cfs).21 The smaller 1948 flood
affected the entire Basin on both sides of the border. The
worst damage occurred in Vanport, Oregon where the floods
destroyed a community of 18,000 and killed at least thirtytwo people.22
Flood flows typically occur in the Columbia River Basin
during May and June as a result of melting of the
accumulated winter snowpack. Flood events are associated
with above-average snow accumulations, prolonged and
intensive melting - in some cases augmented by heavy rain.
While streamflows recede during the later summer and into
the fall and winter months, heavy rains and low-elevation
snow melt can trigger autumn and winter flood events in the
lower Basin.23

19. For flooding on the Red River, another river shared by both Canada and the
United States, see Int’l J. Comm’n, Living with the Red A Report to the Governments
of Canada and the United States on Reducing Flood Impacts in the Red River Basin
(Nov. 2000), available at http://www.ijc.org/rel/pdf/001590part1e.pdf.
20. See Cosens, supra note 18, at 242 (noting that the year-to-year variability of
the unregulated peak flow of the Columbia is 1:34 whereas the St. Lawrence has a
yearly variation of 1:2 and the Mississippi has a peak flow variation of 1:25).
21. See Columbia River Treaty: Hearing before the Committee on Foreign
Relations, 87th Cong. 45 (1961) (statement of Ivan White, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for European Affairs) [hereinafter Senate Ratification Hearings];
see also id. at 46 & 53 (statements of Lt. General Emerson C. Itschner, Chief of
Engineers, U.S. Army).
22. Id. at 53.
23. FCOP 2003, supra note 12, at 8–9. The Willamette River is a major contributor
to the risk of winter floods in the Portland/Vancouver harbor area. U.S. ARMY CORPS
OF ENG’RS, THE EFFECTS OF VARQ AT LIBBY AND HUNGRY HORSE ON COLUMBIA

https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjelp/vol2/iss1/1

8

Bankes: The Flood Control Regime of the Columbia River Treaty: Before and

2012]

THE FLOOD CONTROL REGIME OF THE COLUMBIA
RIVER TREATY

9

Figure 1: Columbia River Basin24

John Krutilla, writing in the mid-1960s, summarized the
distribution of the flood risk in the Basin as follows:
The major area of general flood hazard is in the
floodplain of the Lower Columbia in a reach of about
140 miles downstream from the Bonneville Dam.
Here, because of the relatively dense settlement, high
valued agricultural pursuits, and the urban industrial
developments along the floodplain, the damage
potential is large amounting to roughl
roughly
y 90 per cent of
the estimated total throughout the Columbia Basin.24
Policy responses to the threat of floods may take several
forms. One possible response is to construct levees in
vulnerable areas. Indeed a system of levees was completed
during the 1930s to protect about sixty percent of the 140mile stretch referred to above.25 These levees were capable of
RIVER SYSTEM FLOOD CONTROL 4 (1999), available at http://www.nwdwc.usace.army.mil/cafe/forecast/VARQ/varq.htm. The Willamette joins the mainstem
downs
downstream
tream of The Dalles.
24. Nw. Power and Conservation Council, Public Affairs Division (1999) (on file
with Washington Journal of Environmental Law & Policy).
25. John V. Krutilla, Resources for the Future, The Columbia River Treaty: The
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containing flows of up to 800,000 cfs as measured at The
Dalles.26 The Corps estimated that further levees could offer
protection against flows of up to 940,000 cfs at The Dalles,
but that it was impractical to go beyond that.27 By contrast,
In the upper Columbia and related subbasins the
potential flood damage is of a different order,
occurring often in response to localized weather and
runoff conditions which do not necessarily contribute
to peak discharges on the lower Columbia. On the
Kootenay, a persistent problem of significant
proportions occurs with a frequency of about one in
five years at Bonners Ferry, Idaho, and in the Creston
Flats area of British Columbia.28
While an upstream storage dam on the Kootenay (such as
Libby, eventually authorized and built under the terms of the
CRT) could and did offer Bonners Ferry protection, the Corps
of Engineers also developed a relatively low cost local
alternative to protect this area.29
A second option is to build storage facilities in the Basin
upstream of areas that are vulnerable to flooding, and to
operate those facilities so as to evacuate storage prior to high
run-offs and then refill the storage as the run-off commences,
thereby reducing peak flows in flood-prone areas. Prior to the
Treaty, the United States had already built flood control
facilities on the Columbia and its main tributaries: the Snake
and the Pend Oreille, Clark Fork and Flathead systems. The
major storage facilities included Kerr (1938), Hungry Horse
(1953), Albeni Falls (1955), Palisades (1957), and Grand
Coulee (1944).30 These facilities provided between eight and
ten million acre-feet (maf) of available storage.31 Canada also

Economics of an International River Basin Development 19–22 (1967). Krutilla is one
of the founding fathers of resource or environmental economics and this book is
widely regarded as one of the key (and contemporaneous) sources on the Treaty and
the background to the Treaty.
26. Id. at 27.
27. Id. at 34.
28. Id. at 22–23.
29. Id. at 143; Senate Ratification Hearings, supra note 21, at 50 (statements of
Lt. General Emerson C. Itschner, Chief of Engineers, U.S. Army).
30. Krutilla, supra note 25, at 25 (providing a table of power projects and storage
as of 1959).
31. Id. at 23 (suggesting that existing storage and projects under construction
provided about 10.5 maf of potentially usable storage, but that difficulties with using
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provided storage in Kootenay Lake under the terms of IJC
approval for the Corra Linn dam.32 Other facilities were built
concurrently with Treaty projects or shortly thereafter
including Dworshak on the North Fork of the Clearwater
(Snake). The Columbia River Treaty provided additional
flood control opportunities at Libby in the United States and
at the three Canadian treaty dams (Mica, Duncan and
Arrow/Keenleyside). Canadian commitments under the
Treaty afforded U.S. authorities the opportunity to develop
an integrated flood control plan for the major dams on the
entire Columbia Basin system. Storage in these facilities now
totals more than forty maf (both Treaty and non-treaty,
Canadian and United States) available to the Corps above
The Dalles.33 This total includes both so-called primary
storage under the Treaty (8.45 maf) and on call storage.
The basic approach to storage can be described as follows.34
First, based on snowpack and precipitation data, the Corps
prepares a monthly water supply forecast (WSF) for each
sub-basin and for the entire Columbia River System
extending to The Dalles. This process is initiated in early
January and continued on a monthly basis through April.
Applying the WSF to storage reservation diagrams developed
for each of the major facilities, the Corps calculates end-of
January reservoir target elevations at the main facilities
adequate to provide storage space to meet flood control
objectives at The Dalles. A set of calculations allows the
Corps to work backwards to determine how much water must
be retained in storage to achieve, or at least not exceed, a
particular flow level at The Dalles.35 Reservoirs reach
2012]

the lower tier of valves at Grand Coulee reduced the effective storage to about eight
maf); see also id. at 36. But note that the effectiveness of these facilities varies
considerable. For example, inflows into Hungry Horse are relatively small and it is
located many days travel time upstream of the most sensitive flood areas.
32. See Bankes, supra note 6, at 30–35 (providing background to that Order of
Approval). Article IV of the Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 9, provides that no
person may construct a dam on a transboundary river that changes water levels at
the boundary without the approval of the IJC.
33. FCOP 2003, supra note 12, at 43 (Table 1, Reservoir Project Data for Columbia
Basin Flood Control System). The main facilities are: Mica, Arrow, Duncan
(Canada); Libby, Hungry Horse, Kerr, Noxon Rapids, Albeni Falls, Grand Coulee,
Dworshak, Brownlee and John Day (U.S.). Dworshak and Brownlee are on the
Snake.
34. See VARQ FINAL EIS, supra note 13, at 13–14.
35. For a review of the uncertainties associated with such calculations especially
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maximum flood control draft by about May 1, with refill
beginning thereafter based upon the calculated flow at The
Dalles, water supply forecasts, available reservoir space and
weather forecasts.
A third set of options can be characterized as a soft path,
as opposed to either of the hard paths discussed above (i.e.,
dams and levees). Soft paths are adaptive and recognize that
we need to learn to live with floods. Soft paths include
landscape level responses such as retaining or restoring
forest cover and restoring functioning floodplains or
discouraging human settlement in flood plains.36 Climate
change has necessitated more attention to soft paths as part
of adaptive responses to changes in precipitation, snow pack
and the increased intensity of weather events.37 The CRT
does not discuss soft options. Instead, the Treaty adopts hard
path solutions to the problems posed by flooding without
precluding adoption of additional “soft” measures.

early in the season see FCOP 2003, supra note 12, at 67 (discussing this in the
context of on-call storage use).
36. For discussion in the context of the Columbia River, see Barbara Cosens,
Resilience and Law as a Theoretical Backdrop for Natural Resource Management
Flood Management in the Columbia Basin, forthcoming in Environmental Law
(2012). Cosens argues that “non-structural measures should be the primary focus of
new expenditure on flood risk management in the Columbia River Basin over the
next sixty-year period of treaty implementation to align flood risk management with
management for ecosystem resilience.” Id. at 4.
37. See, e.g., A. F. Hamlet, Assessing water resources adaptive capacity to climate
change impacts in the Pacific Northwest Region of North America, Hydrol. Earth
Syst. Sci., 15, 1427–43 (2011):
Relatively warm basins near the coast and in moderate elevation areas on the
west slopes of the Rocky Mountains (e.g. in Idaho and Montana) tend to show
higher flood risk due to increasing cool season precipitation and the increasing
effective basin area that accompanies rising snow lines, whereas colder basins in
the interior and northern parts of the region show small changes (or even
decreasing flood risk) in spring due to systematic loss of snowpack). Low lying,
rain dominant basins show modest increases in flood risk associated with
increased winter precipitation.
While there is regional variability, the general story in the Basin is a shift from
snowmelt, to transient snow and to rainfall dominant in terms of streamflow inputs.
Climate Impacts Group, Center for Science in the Earth System, University of
Washington, Final Report for the Columbia Basin Climate Change Scenarios Ch. 7
(2010), available at http://www.hydro.washington.edu/2860/products/sites/r7climate/
study_report/CBCCSP_chap7_extremes_final.pdf.
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INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRINCIPLES OF
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13

It is important to examine the CRT in the broader
normative context of public international law just as we
interpret a domestic statute within the context of a broader
normative order that includes both constitutional norms, as
well as our understanding of other statutes and the common
law. This part examines what general international law has
to say about the obligations of international watercourse
states in relation to flood control. It also offers some brief
comments on treaty interpretation based on the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties.38
A.

International Watercourse Law and Flood Control

For the purposes of this paper I will assume that we can
find a modern statement39 of the customary law obligations of
a watercourse state in relation to flood control in the
provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses
(Convention).40 Neither Canada nor the United States has
ratified this Convention and it has not been widely ratified.
Additionally, the Convention itself contains an important
proviso as to its future application. Thus, Article 3(1)
provides that:
1. In the absence of an agreement to the contrary,
nothing in the present Convention shall affect the
rights or obligations of a watercourse State arising
from agreements in force for it on the date on which it
38. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
39. There is not a large body of literature on flood control obligations in
international law. An earlier effort to codify international watercourse law, The
Helsinki Rules of the International Law Association (ILA), contain chapters on
equitable utilization, pollution, navigation and timber floating, but nothing
specifically on flood control. See Int’l Law Ass’n, Fifty-Second Conf., Helsinki, Fin.,
Aug. 1966, The Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.52/484 Ch. 2–5 (1967). However, the ILA subsequently developed a set
of eight articles plus commentary addressing the topic of flood control at its 55th
Meeting in 1972. For the report, see ILA, Fifty-Fifth Conf., New York, U.S., Aug.
1972, Rep. of the Fifty-Fifth Conf. 22, 43–97 (1974).
40. See generally Convention, supra note 8; see also STEPHEN C. MCCAFFREY, THE
LAW OF INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES PT. IV (2d ed, 2007) (providing additional
and more detailed commentary on the Convention).
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became a party to the present Convention.
Nevertheless, many parts of the Convention represent a
codification of customary international law and may be used
both to supplement the provisions of the CRT where there is
a gap in the topics covered by the Treaty, and to influence the
interpretation of open textured terms in the Treaty.41
The International Court of Justice referred to the
Convention
in
Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros
Project
(Hungary/Slovakia).42 The subject of the litigation was a
bilateral river treaty, analogous to the CRT. The litigation
also pre-dated the U.N. Convention, and neither state was a
party to the U.N. Convention. Nevertheless, the Court still
thought it appropriate to draw on the terms of the
Convention. In Gabčíkovo, the Court relied on the principle of
reasonable and equitable utilization, as incorporated in the
Convention, to conclude that Slovakia’s decision to proceed
unilaterally with a variation of the project (referred to as
Variant C) could not qualify as a lawful countermeasure. The
court found that Slovakia’s action was not proportionate to
the harm that had been inflicted by Hungary when it
breached the treaty by refusing to complete the proposed
diversion project:
The Court considers that Czechoslovakia, by
unilaterally assuming control of a shared resource,
and thereby depriving Hungary of its right to an
equitable and reasonable share of the natural
resources of the Danube - with the continuing effects
of the diversion of these waters on the ecology of the
41. The context for the purposes of treaty interpretation shall comprise, in
addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes: “…(c) any relevant rules of
international law applicable in the relations between the parties.” Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 38, at art. 31(3)(c). The academic
commentary on this important provision includes Duncan French, Treaty
Interpretation and the Incorporation of Extraneous Legal Rules, 55 INT’L & COMP.
L.Q. 281 (2006); Campbell McLachlan, The Principles of Systemic Integration and
Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention, 54 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 279 (2005); RICHARD
K. GARDINER, TREATY INTERPRETATION CH. 7 (2008); Philippe Sands, Treaty, Custom
and the Cross-fertilization of International Law, 1 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 85
(1998). For further discussion of Article 31 see Part III.B. of the paper, infra.
42. Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. 92 (Sept.
25). Perhaps more surprising, in Pulp Mills, the Court did not refer to the U.N.
Convention in its judgment. See Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.),
Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. 135 (Apr. 20); see also Owen McIntyre, The World Court’s
Ongoing Contribution to International Water Law: The Pulp Mills Case between
Argentina and Uruguay, 4 WATER ALTERNATIVES 124, 143 (2011).
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riparian area of the Szigetkoz - failed to respect the
proportionality which is required by international
law.42
The Court based its assessment of what was equitable and
reasonable (and therefore what was proportionate) on its
understanding that the U.N. Convention represents
customary law.
The Convention, adopted in 1997, is largely based on the
work of the U.N.’s International Law Commission (ILC). The
ILC’s version of the text is accompanied by an agreed
Commentary, which inter alia explains the background and
the various sources on which the text draws.43 The next
section of this article is based on the official treaty text but
makes frequent reference to the Commentary.44
Much of the Convention deals with the principle of
equitable and reasonable utilization of water, the general
duty to cooperate, and the procedural obligations that
watercourse states owe to each other in relation to so-called
“planned measures.”45 The general duty to cooperate “on the
basis of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, mutual
benefit, and good faith in order to attain optimal utilization
and adequate protection of an international watercourse”46 is
significant in the present context. On the one hand, it can be
argued that the CRT itself is precisely a manifestation of the
duty to cooperate with a view towards optimal utilization. On
the other hand, it suggests that even if one of the two states
2012]

43. See generally United Nations, Draft Articles on the Law of the Nonnavigational Uses of International Watercourses and Commentaries Thereto and
Resolution on Transboundary Confined Groundwater (1994) [hereinafter ILC
Commentary], available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/
commentaries/8_3_1994.pdf (commentary prepared by the Int’l Law Comm’n on the
second reading of the Draft Articles).
44. This is standard practice in international law. See e.g., Gabčíkovo, supra note
42, at ¶ 50 (where the Court relies heavily on the ILC commentary on the law of
state responsibility when resolving an issue about the defense of necessity).
45. The Convention does not define the term planned measures, but the ILC’s
Commentary to Article 10 contemplates that “[t]he term ‘measures’ is to be taken in
its broad sense, that is to say as including new projects or programmes of a major or
minor nature, as well as changes in existing uses of an international watercourse.”
ILC Commentary, supra note 43.
46. Convention, supra note 8, at art. 8. U.N. Convention. The quoted Convention
text added two matters: the reference to “good faith” and the reference to “adequate
protection.” See ILC Commentary, supra note 43, at 106 ¶ 2 (referencing “good
faith”).
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took steps in 2014 to terminate the CRT, there would still be
general customary international law obligations on both
states, including the duty to continue to explore optimizing
solutions—at least when approached by the other state.
A state proposing to undertake a planned measure,47 which
may have a significant effect on another watercourse state,
must provide notification of such a measure along with the
appropriate technical data that would allow the other state to
assess the implications of the proposed measure. Additional
procedural obligations may follow depending on the response
received to the notification.
In addition to the planned measures provisions of the
Convention, there are also a number of articles dealing with
the
management
and
regulation
of
international
watercourses (Articles 24 and 25) and installations (Article
26). “Management” in this context, refers to both the
sustainable development of the watercourse and the
“protection and control of the watercourse.”48 Watercourse
states “shall enter into consultations” with respect to the
management of an international watercourse including
consultation with respect to establishing a “joint
management mechanism.”49 But perhaps more significant
than management in this context is Article 25, which calls
upon states to cooperate, where appropriate, in responding to
needs and opportunities to regulate the flow of the waters of
an international watercourse.50 The Convention requires
watercourse states to cooperate and equally share in
construction, maintenance and cost-sharing of regulation
works. The Commentary also states that “when one
watercourse State agrees with another to undertake

46. The Convention does not define the term planned measures, but the ILC’s
Commentary to Article 10 contemplates that “[t]he term ‘measures’ is to be taken in
its broad sense, that is to say as including new projects or programmes of a major or
minor nature, as well as changes in existing uses of an international watercourse.”
ILC Commentary, supra note 43.
48. See Convention, supra note 8, at art. 24(2).
49. Id. The current provisions of the CRT likely constitute such a joint
management mechanism because they provide for ongoing implementation of the
Treaty through the two Entities (Art. XIV) as supervised by the Permanent
Engineering Board (Art. XV). See Columbia River Treaty, supra note 1.
50. Article 25(3) defines regulation as the use of hydraulic works or any other
continuing measure to alter, vary or otherwise control the flow of the waters of an
international watercourse. Convention, supra note 8, at art. 25(3).
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regulation works, and receives benefits therefrom, the former
would be obligated, in the absence of agreement to the
contrary, to contribute to the construction and maintenance
of the works in proportion to the benefits it received
therefrom.”51 Thus, the Convention adopts a “sharing the
benefits” approach, rather than simply sharing the costs.
Article 26 deals with watercourse installations, and in
particular, contemplates that a watercourse state shall use
its best efforts to maintain installations so that any
deterioration in such facilities may be arrested so as not to
cause harm to another watercourse state. The Commentary
offers the example of the duty of the watercourse state to
maintain a dam in a state of repair “such that it will not
burst, causing significant harm to other watercourse
States.”52 The Article does not deal specifically with the
example of an upstream watercourse state that wishes to
reconfigure an existing dam to better achieve its own goals,
but potentially render it less useful for flood control purposes.
For example, an upstream state might wish to reconfigure
outlet valves at upstream dams, thereby, reducing the flood
control discharge capacity of the dam.53
2012]

51. ILC Commentary, supra note 43, at art. 25 ¶ 2.
52. Id.
53. The discharge capacity of a dam depends upon a number of variables
including: elevation, configuration of spillways, bottom outlets or valves, tailwater
effects below the dam, and generating units. In some cases, changes may increase
discharge capacity. For example, the discharge capacity at the Keenleyside dam was
expanded with the installation of generation at that facility. As originally built,
there was no generation installed at either Duncan or Arrow. Some generation (185
MW) has since been installed immediately downstream of Arrow/Keenleyside and
more is possible. See Columbia Power Corporation, Projects: Arrow Lakes
Generating Station, http://www.columbiapower.org/projects/arrowlakesstation.asp
(last visited Mar. 21, 2012); see also Columbia Power Corporation, Keenleyside 150
MW Powerplant Project: Report and Recommendations of the Keenleyside Project
Committee with respect to a Decision on a Project Approval Certificate and
Fulfilling the Requirements of a Screening Report Pursuant to the Canadian
Environmental
Assessment
Act
(1998),
available
at
http://a100.gov.bc.ca/appsdata/epic/documents/p3/1054665240172_
d5c7937e56964532b103c78bcb435fa3.pdf (environmental assessment of the project).
From a Canadian perspective, Arrow/Keenlesyide could originally only be justified
on the basis of the downstream power benefits that it would be accorded under
Article V of the Treaty. See Johnson, supra note 6, at 754 (referring to McNaughton,
chair of the Canadian section of the IJC in the 1950s and noting that “High Arrow
provides little advantage to Canada other than to produce the benefits to
downstream power in the United States which may be sold.”). In a Treaty
termination scenario (i.e., no continuing downstream power benefits to Canada),
Canada will wish to maintain Arrow at a high level in order to maintain a high head
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It seems unlikely that there is a duty to maintain existing
facilities in exactly the same configuration, but any such
proposed change would still need to be scrutinized in light of
the general duty of reasonable and equitable utilization
(Articles 5 and 6) and the obligation not to cause significant
harm (Article 7). The latter duty calls upon each watercourse
state to exercise due diligence to ensure that its utilization of
a watercourse does not cause significant harm to another
watercourse state. It is likely that a change to an existing
facility on which the downstream state had come to rely
would constitute a “planned measure” within the meaning of
Articles 11 – 19, thereby triggering the series of procedural
obligations including: the exchange of information (Article
11), notification (Articles 12 – 16) and potentially
consultation and negotiations (Article 17).
Articles 27 and 28 deal separately with two related
problems: (1) harmful conditions and (2) emergency
situations. Article 27 discusses the first issue—the
prevention and mitigation of harmful and potentially
harmful situations (i.e. it is anticipatory in nature).54 The
Article calls upon watercourse states “individually and,
where appropriate, jointly, to take all appropriate measures
to prevent or mitigate conditions . . . that may be harmful to
other watercourse States,”55 including, “floods, ice floes,
drought and water-borne diseases.”56 This applies to
conditions resulting from natural causes, human causes or
some combination of the two and possible responses are those
deemed “appropriate.”57 In some cases, the responses may be
immediate, but the Commentary suggests that parties must
also consider long-term plans and activities, such as the
construction of dams: “[w]hile States cannot prevent
phenomena resulting entirely from natural causes, they can
do much to prevent and mitigate harmful conditions that are
consequent upon such phenomena. For example, floods may
to maximize generation. See U.S. ENTITY, SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT, supra note 4, at
23. If Arrow is not subject to drafting by the United States for prescribed flood
control or an assured power operation, the economics of installing additional
generation at Keenleyside may be improved.
54. Convention supra note 8, at art. 27.
55. Id.
56. ILC Commentary, supra note 43, at art. 27(1).
57. Id. at art. 27(2)–(3).
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be prevented, or their severity mitigated, through the
construction of reservoirs, afforestation, or improved range
management practices.”58
Conversely, Article 28 deals with emergency situations.
The term “emergency” is defined as “a situation that causes,
or poses an imminent threat of causing, serious harm to
watercourse States” whether resulting from a natural cause
such as a flood, or human conduct.59 A situation may be an
emergency even if it is expected, such as a flood following a
prolonged and severe weather event.60 An emergency triggers
not only a duty to notify other potentially affected states and
relevant international organizations, but also requires that a
“watercourse State within whose territory an emergency
originates, shall, in cooperation with potentially affected
States and, where appropriate, competent international
organizations, immediately take all practicable measures
necessitated by the circumstances to prevent, mitigate and
eliminate harmful effects of the emergency.”61
The Commentary notes that both the duty to notify and
the duty to mitigate apply even where the emergency
situation results from entirely natural causes and “there may
well be no liability” for the harmful effects that may be
suffered by another watercourse state.62 The duty to mitigate
as expressed here is far reaching—although qualified insofar
as it is a duty to take only such practicable measures as are
necessitated by the circumstances.63 Overlapping to some
degree with the anticipatory functions of Article 27, Article
28(4) contemplates that watercourse states should, where
necessary, develop contingency plans for responding to
emergencies.64
Although cursory, this review of the relevant general
norms supports four conclusions which may be relevant for
2012]

58. Id. at art. 27(3). Note that these measures include soft and hard measures—
although they do focus on upstream mitigation measures rather than downstream
adaptation measures.
59. Convention, supra note 8, at art. 28.
60. ILC Commentary, supra note 43, at art. 28(2).
61. Convention, supra note 8, at art. 28.
62. ILC Commentary, supra note 43, at art. 28(2).
63. It is perhaps surprising that the article does not refer to any duty to
compensate in the event that measures taken by the upstream state cause an
economic or other loss for that state.
64. Convention, supra note 8, at art. 28.
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the following different but related purposes: to assist in the
interpretation of the CRT, to fill in gaps in the CRT, and/or to
govern the relationship between the two states should either
elect to terminate the Treaty.
The first conclusion is that customary law imposes a
general duty on watercourse states to cooperate. The
existence of this duty may be particularly important in a
treaty termination context in which the United States elects
to forego the prescribed power operation from Canadian
dams in return for retaining all of the downstream power
benefits. In that scenario, the United States will face
considerable uncertainty in planning for flood risk
management operations and so will need to model various
Canadian operating scenarios.65 It is at least arguable that,
notwithstanding treaty termination, Canada has some
obligation to provide information, as available, to facilitate
U.S. planning activities. This conclusion is reinforced by the
fact that some flood control measures will continue (e.g. the
on-call operation) and a good faith implementation of this
provision requires Canada to take measures necessary to
make the call effective.66
Second, measures taken by an upstream state to
reconfigure upstream storage in a way that will reduce the
flood protection available to a downstream state will trigger a
duty to notify the downstream state before undertaking those
measures. That notification may, in turn, trigger additional
procedural obligations such as the planned measures
provisions of Articles 11 through 17. Reconfiguration does not
include changes to the operation of existing facilities (such as
optimizing for power and local flood control rather than
system-wide flood control) although the general duty to
cooperate,67 and the more specific duty to enter into
consultations with respect to management of the
watercourse,68 might well embrace a continuing duty to
discuss these matters if requested by the downstream state.
Third, any agreement by watercourse states to take
cooperative measures must be based on the premise that the

65. ENTITIES PHASE 1 REPORT, supra note 4, at 82–83.
66. See discussion infra Part III.B. regarding “good faith.”
67. See Convention, supra note 8, at art. 8.
68. Id. at art. 24.
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affected states should share both the costs of any facilities
and the benefits conferred. As discussed in the next section,
this principle is fully consistent with the work of the IJC in
developing the principles that informed the CRT
negotiations. This principle may be particularly relevant to
option three (i.e. a modification of the existing treaty so as to
provide for some continuation of assured flood control post2024) developed in a preliminary way by the Entities as part
of the Phase 1 studies. This principle suggests that Canada
will be fully justified in negotiating for a share of any
resulting flood control benefits (i.e. avoided costs) in addition
to the current treaty provisions that simply compensate
Canada for any economic losses associated with providing the
post-2024 called-upon flood control.
Fourth, there is a general duty to take all practicable
measures to prevent, mitigate and avoid emergency
situations such as those that might be caused by floods or
other extreme weather events (to the extent that the other
party cannot provide this on their own). Given that even in
the treaty termination scenario (option 2) the United States
is still entitled to an on call/called upon flood control
operation (see Part V.B.4 of the article for a more detailed
explanation), this general duty serves to reinforce the treaty
norm.
2012]

B.

Observations on Treaty Interpretation and
Implementation

Any assessment of the CRT’s flood control provisions must
be based on an interpretation of the text of the Treaty. The
interpreter must locate the specific treaty text in the broader
context of international law including other relevant treaties
and applicable norms of customary law. The rules on treaty
interpretation are codified in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).69 A draft of the

69. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 38, at art. 31–32. For
academic commentary on the rules of interpretation prescribed by the VCLT see
Gardiner, supra note 41; ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE CH.
13 (2d. ed. 2007); BRITISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW, 40
YEARS OF THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES (Alexander
Orakhelashvili & Sarah Williams eds., 2010) [hereinafter 40 YEARS OF THE VIENNA
CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES]. The principal older source is IAN SINCLAIR,
THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES (2d. ed. 1984).
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Convention was prepared by the ILC. While the United
States is not a party to the VCLT and while, on its terms the
VCLT does not apply to treaties already in force (such as the
CRT),70 both the International Court of Justice and countless
arbitral panels have accepted that these provisions constitute
customary international law and should be applied as such.71
The VCLT provisions state:
Article 31: General Rule of Interpretation
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to
the terms of the treaty in their context and in the
light of its object and purpose.
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of
a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text,
including its preamble and annexes:
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was
made between all the parties in connection with the
conclusion of the treaty;
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more
parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty
and accepted by the other parties as an instrument
related to the treaty.
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the
context:
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties
regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the
application of its provisions;
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the
treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties
regarding its interpretation;
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable
in the relations between the parties.
70. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 38, at art. 4; see also
Dispute Regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v. Nicar.), 2009
I.C.J.213, ¶ 75 (July 13); Alexander Orakhelashvili, The Recent Practice on the
Principles of Treaty Interpretation, in 40 YEARS OF THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE
LAW OF TREATIES, supra note 69, at 117, 119.
71. See, e.g., Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, ¶ 46
(Sept. 25); see also Iron Rhine Railway (Belg. v. Neth.), Hague Ct. Rep. (Scott) ¶¶
44–61 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2005); Dispute Concerning Access to Information Under
Article 9 of the OSPAR Convention (Ir. v. U.K.), Hague Ct. Rep. (Scott) ¶¶ 81–82
(Perm Ct. Arb. 2003).
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4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is
established that the parties so intended.

2012]

23

Article 32 Supplementary Means of Interpretation
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of
interpretation, including the preparatory work of the
treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in
order to confirm the meaning resulting from the
application of article 31, or to determine the meaning
when the interpretation according to article 31:
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or
(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or
unreasonable.
Article 31 states the general rule. It is a single compound
rule, and while the three paragraphs “might appear to create
a hierarchy of legal norms, that is not so: the three
paragraphs represent a logical progression, nothing more.
One naturally begins with the text, followed by the context,
and then other matters . . . .”72 There is, however, a hierarchy
between Articles 31 and 32, the latter being titled
“[s]upplementary means of interpretation.”73 The commentary
suggests that in drafting Article 31, the International Law
Commission was attempting to balance the textual or literal
approach to treaty interpretation with a more teleological
approach, which emphasizes the object and purpose of the
treaty.74 Thus, the formulation requires that the interpreter
refer to both the text and the object and purpose of the
treaty. The “good faith” language of Article 31 is relevant to
the performance of treaty obligations as well as the
interpretation of those obligations.75 The object and purpose
72. AUST, supra note 69, at 234; see also Iron Rhine Railway (Belg. v. Neth.),
Hague Ct. Rep. (Scott) ¶¶ 47 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2005); Gardiner, supra note 41, at 141
(quoting the arbitral award found in Aguas del Tunari, S.A. v Republic of Bol. ICSID
Case No. ARB/02/3, Decision on Respondent’s Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 91 (Oct.
21, 2005)) (referring to the application of Article 31 as a process of progressive
encirclement).
73. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 38, at Article 32.
74. See AUST, supra note 69, at 231; but see AUST, supra note 69, at 235
(suggesting that Article 31 accords “precedence to the textual.”).
75. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 38, at Article 26 (“Every
treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in
good faith.”); see also Application of Interim Accord of 13 September 1995 (Former
Yugoslav Republic of Maced. v. Greece), 2011 I.C.J. 142, ¶ 131 (Dec. 5); Case C118/07, Comm’n v. Republic of Finland, 2009 E.C.R. I-10889, ¶ 39; Gabčíkovo-
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of a treaty is to be derived from a consideration of the treaty
as whole, including the preamble.76
More recently, in its work on Treaties Over Time, the
International Law Commission claims to have identified
three different approaches that interpreters have adopted
when applying articles 31 and 32:77 (1) a conventional
approach, which takes all the means of interpretation
referred to in Article 31 into account without according
noticeably greater weight to one approach over another, (2) a
text oriented approach that accords greater weight to the
text, and (3) a purpose oriented approach that gives greater
weight to the object and purpose of the instrument.
For interpretation purposes, Article 31(2) defines the
context of a treaty to include the text, annexes and preamble,
any agreements relating to the treaty made by both parties
and any instrument made by one party and accepted by the
other as an instrument relating to the treaty.78 Both the
agreements and instruments must be put in place in
connection with the “conclusion of the treaty.”79 An example
of the former might be the Exchange of Notes of 22 January
1964 relating to the sale in the United States of Canada’s
downstream power benefits.80 An example of the latter might
be the two agreements between Canada and British
Columbia relating to the apportionment of rights and
responsibilities under the Treaty.81
Nagymaros Project, 1997 I.C.J. 7 at ¶ 142. The duty of good faith would likely
preclude a party from taking unilateral action solely in order to make it more
difficult for it to fulfill its treaty obligations.
76. See, e.g., Lauder v. Czech Republic, Final Award, at ¶ 292 (UNCITRAL Arb.
Trib. Sept. 3, 2001) http://italaw.com/documents/LauderAward.pdf; see also Nat’l
Grid P.L.C. v. Argentine Republic, Case 1:09-cv-00248-RBW, Award, at ¶ 170
(UNCITRAL Arb. Trib. Nov. 3, 2008), http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/NGvArgenti
na.pdf.
77. See generally Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of its Sixty-Third Sess., 63d.
Sess., Apr. 26–June 3, July 4–Aug. 12, 2011, ¶¶ 340–44, U.N. Doc. A/66/10 and Ad.
1; GAOR, 66th Sess., Supp. No. 10.
78. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 38, at Article 31(2).
79. There is room for debate as to when the CRT was concluded. The main body of
the text was finalized in 1961 and it was that text which was sent to the U.S. Senate
for its advice and consent; however, that was followed by subsequent negotiations in
relation to the Protocol.
80. See Columbia River Treaty, supra note 1, at Annex to Exchange of Notes. See
also 15.2 U.S.T. 1555, 1578, 1583–88.
81. See CAN., DEP’TS OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS AND NORTHERN AFFAIRS AND
NATIONAL RESOURCES, THE COLUMBIA RIVER TREATY PROTOCOL AND RELATED
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The precise classification of the Protocol for the purposes of
the VCLT generally and specifically within the context of
Article 31 may be subject to debate. One view is that the
Protocol is simply another treaty which amends the CRT and
therefore should be considered under Article 31(1).
Alternatively, the Protocol can be seen as an agreement
relating to the Treaty made in connection with the conclusion
of the Treaty (Article 31(2)(a)).82 However, since Article 31 is
expressed as a single rule, little should turn on this
distinction.83
The other matters identified in Article 31(3)—which should
inform the interpretation of the Treaty—consist of
subsequent agreements, subsequent practice, and other
relevant rules of international law binding the Parties. There
are many examples of subsequent agreements84 and
subsequent practice85 in relation to the CRT that must be
assessed before reaching any definitive conclusion as to the
meaning of a particular text.86 The relevant rules of
2012]

DOCUMENTS 100–109 (1964) (pertaining to the Agreements of July 8, 1963 and Jan.
13, 1964 between Canada and British Columbia). The issue here would be whether
the United States accepts the agreements as instruments related to the Treaty,
which requires further research. But see Swainson, supra note 6, at ch.9.
(articulating that the United States did have an interest in the content of these
agreements).
82. It is important in this context to examine the precise language of the Exchange
of Notes of Jan. 22, 1964 endorsing the terms of the protocol. See Columbia River
Treaty, supra note 1, at Annex to Exchange of Notes. Canada’s note provides that
the two notes plus the Protocol “shall constitute an agreement between our two
Governments relating to the Treaty.” 15.2 U.S.T. 1555, 1578, 1583–88. The U.S. note
was to the same effect. Similar language is used in the Exchange of Notes of Jan. 22,
1964 relating to the downstream power benefits except that these notes describe the
agreement as “an agreement … relating to the treaty,” which is the precise language
of the VCLT even though the VCLT was not adopted until 1969. Id.
83. See Gardiner, supra note 41, at 212–13.
84. For example, if one looks at any Annual Report of the PEB it contains a list of
supplementary agreements between the Entities that were either concluded or
applied during that year. In addition, there are agreements allowing the Canadian
Entity to move flood control space between Canadian Treaty reservoirs. Not all of
these agreements are of the same status. Some are between the Entities and not the
parties and in some cases, at least the parties to the agreements have taken care to
limit the precedential effect of any such agreement. All of this would have to be
carefully evaluated and considered in any definitive interpretation of the CRT.
85. For a recent decision in which the International Court of Justice referred to
subsequent practices, see Application of Interim Accord of 13 Sept. 1995 (Former
Yugoslav Republic of Maced. v. Greece), 2011 I.C.J. 142, ¶¶ 99–101 (Dec. 5); In the
same case the Court declined to rely on the travaux. Id. at ¶ 102.
86. See Gardiner, supra note 41, at 216–25 (discussing arbitral awards and case
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international law include customary norms as well as
treaties and would therefore include customary rules of law
relating to international watercourses. Thus, while the U.N.
Convention does not apply as a treaty between Canada and
the United States, it is relevant to the interpretation of the
treaty obligations of the Parties to the extent that it codifies
customary norms, especially where the treaty uses opentextured language.87
Finally, Article 32 refers to the travaux (i.e. the negotiating
records of the treaty) as a supplementary means of
interpretation. An interpreter can rely on the travaux either
to confirm a meaning already established (based on the
principles codified in Article 31) or to determine the meaning
where the text is inter alia ambiguous or obscure.88 Travaux
are available to the treaty parties but are not generally
available to the public. Tribunals routinely refer to the
law on subsequent agreements). Id. at 225–49 (discussing subsequent practices). In
addition, international case law provides specific examples of this idea in action. See,
e.g., Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana/Namibia), 1999 I.C.J. 1045, ¶ 49 (Dec. 13)
(referring to subsequent agreements). Id. at ¶¶ 49–87 (referring to subsequent
practices). This case is particularly useful in emphasizing what will not qualify as
subsequent practice. In particular, the practice relied on must at the very least be
known to the other party and it must show agreement rather than a continuing
disagreement.
87. See Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, ¶ 140 (Sept.
25); Dispute Regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v. Nicar.), 2009
I.C.J.213, ¶ 64 (July 13) (citing Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turk.),
1978 I.C.J. 32, ¶ 77) (“[W]here the parties have used generic terms in a treaty, the
parties necessarily having been aware that the meaning of the terms was likely to
evolve over time, and where the treaty has been entered into for a very long period
or is ‘of continuing duration,’ the parties must be presumed, as a general rule, to
have intended those terms to have an evolving meaning.”). For additional literature
on Article 31(3)(c), see supra note 41 and accompanying text. See also Report of the
Int’l Law Comm’n, Study Group, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties
Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, ¶¶ 410–80,
58th Sess., May 1–June 9, July 3–Aug. 11, 2006, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr. 13,
2006). But see Alexander Orakhelashvili, The Recent Practice on the Principles of
Treaty Interpretation, in 40 YEARS OF THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF
TREATIES, supra note 69, at 143–49, for a more cautious approach to the role of
custom in interpreting treaties.
88. See generally Richard Gardiner, The Role of Preparatory Work in Treaty
Interpretation, in 40 YEARS OF THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES,
supra note 69, at 97–116. Gardiner discusses two approaches to the use of the
travaux: (1) the narrow “bulls eye” approach of some English courts (did the travaux
expressly address the particular question at issue); and (2) the broader “common
understanding approach” based on context and which asks whether the material will
serve the purpose of illuminating a common understanding as to the meaning. See
Iron Rhine Railway (Belg. v. Neth.), Hague Ct. Rep. (Scott) (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2005).
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travaux to confirm the interpretation of treaties.89
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IV. FLOOD CONTROL PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY:
THE IJC’S CONTRIBUTION
The governments of the United States and Canada took
the first step towards developing the CRT when they made a
reference request to the IJC in 1944,90 in which the two
governments asked the IJC to investigate the possibilities for
joint development of the River. In 1958, the IJC reported on
its technical assessment of the alternatives.91 The following
year, the IJC responded to a second reference request with a
set of Principles for Determining and Apportioning Benefits
from Cooperative Use of Storage Waters and Electrical
Interconnection within the Columbia River System.92 This
report contained a set of “general principles,” a set of “power
principles,” and a set of “flood control principles.”93 Each
principle was accompanied by a commentary or discussion94
and was prefaced with two important acknowledgements.
First:
As successive blocks of storage for flood control
purposes are added to the system, the amount of flood
damage that can be prevented per unit of flood control
storage decreases. Accordingly, the value that can be
assigned to upstream storage for flood control
purposes is greater for projects to be constructed in
89. See Gardiner, supra note 41, at ch.8. For an example in practice, see
Kasikili/Sedudu Island, 1999 I.C.J. 1045 at ¶ 46, 89.
90. Per Article IX of the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909, the two Governments
may refer a matter to the IJC for its advice on the issue. However, the IJC’s
recommendations in response to a reference request are not binding on either
Government. See The Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909, supra note 9.
91. See INT’L COLUMBIA RIVER ENG’R BOARD, WATER RESOURCES OF THE
COLUMBIA RIVER BASIN: REPORT TO THE INT’L J. COMM’N (1959).
92. INT’L J. COMM’N, PRINCIPLES FOR DETERMINING AND APPORTIONING BENEFITS
FROM COOPERATIVE USE OF STORAGE OF WATERS AND ELECTRICAL INTERCONNECTION WITHIN THE COLUMBIA RIVER SYSTEM (1959). [hereinafter IJC
PRINCIPLES], available at http://www.crt2014-2024review.gov/Files/IJC.pdf.
93. Id.
94. Note that I am not suggesting that these principles or their commentary can
be used directly to interpret the terms of the CRT since they do not fall within any of
the categories of permissible interpretive materials listed in Articles 31 or 32 of the
VCLT. However, the work of the IJC did inform the negotiations between the
Parties and it may help establish some of the shared assumptions (e.g. desired level
of flood control) on which the negotiations proceeded.
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the near future than for those to be built later.95
Hence, “first-added” storage should be assigned a higher
value than subsequent projects.96
Second, the “hydrologic and hydraulic characteristics” of
the Basin were such that operations for flood control could be
conducted with little or no interference with operations for
power purposes.97
The IJC offered the governments six flood control
principles as follows:
Flood Control Principle No. 1
Flood control benefits should be determined on the
basis of an assured plan of operation and flood control
regulations . . ..98
This principle forms the basis of the FCOP developed by
the Corps and discussed in detail in the Appendix.
Flood Control Principle No. 2
The downstream flood control benefit . . . should be
estimated in advance on the basis of the effectiveness
of such storage in meeting the flood control objectives .
. . in the downstream country at the time the
upstream storage is provided.99
The discussion of this second principle acknowledged that:
In the United States the current primary flood control
objective is to obtain storage sufficient to control a
flood of the magnitude of that of 1894 at The Dalles to
800,000 cfs. All additional storage in the United
95. IJC PRINCIPLES, supra note 92, at 12–13.
96. For further discussion of “first-added,” see Krutilla, supra note 25, at 50–56.
See also THE COLUMBIA RIVER TREATY AND PROTOCOL: A PRESENTATION, supra note
6, at 58–59. The point is actually quite intuitive especially in the context of flood
control. A facility that will be used to offer protection in the case of a one-in-onehundred year flood is less valuable than a facility that will offer protection in the
case of a one-in-ten year flood. Note that assigned value is important if one is trying
to assess the contribution that particular facilities make in conferring a flood or
power control benefit for the purpose of sharing that benefit between the upstream
and downstream states.
97. IJC PRINCIPLES, supra note 92, at 13. This assessment must also be premised
in part on an assessment of seasonal demand, which at that time would have placed
a premium on winter base load generation. This may be more questionable if hydro
is operated to support intermittent forms of generation such as wind and solar. In
other words, the coincidence of interest between power generation and flood control
may be more contingent than suggested by the IJC Principles document.
98. Id. at 13.
99. Id. at 14.
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States or Canada necessary to achieve this objective
(approximately 7 1/2 million acre feet of storage
usable for flood control) would, if included in the flood
control plan, be given equal credit on the basis of the
effectiveness of each acre foot of such storage in
controlling floods at The Dalles. Storage either in the
United States or Canada added after the necessary
amount has been reached to control the 1894 flood to
800,000 cfs would . . . be evaluated at a lesser rate
based on the average value of all additional storage
needed to control the 1894 flood at The Dalles to
600,000 cfs. 100 (Emphasis added).
The discussion indicates that the principal flood control
objective is expressed in terms of managing flows down to
800,000 cfs, with a secondary objective of 600,000 cfs. There
is no mention of a lower desirable control level—a point
which assumes some importance in the current discussions
between the Entities. The discussion also acknowledges the
importance of local flood control objectives and suggested
“[s]torage either in the United States or Canada should be
entitled to credit on the basis of satisfying such local
objectives.”101
Flood Control Principle No. 3 suggested that the value of
the flood control benefit to be assigned to the upstream
storage should be based on the estimated average annual
value of the flood damage prevented by the storage.102 Flood
Control Principle No. 4 contemplated that the upstream state
should receive fifty percent of the value of the benefit
conferred103 According to Flood Control Principle No. 5,
payments might be made as a lump sum or periodically as
the two states might agree.104 Flood Control Principle No. 6
dealt with the circumstances under which the downstream
state might request the upstream state to take additional
flood control measures. In such a case, the downstream state
should fully indemnify the upstream state for any losses it
might suffer, but should also pay the upstream country “half
the damages prevented by the operation for the storage in
2012]

100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. IJC PRINCIPLES, supra note 92, at 15.
104. Id.
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question.”105
Krutilla’s assessment of the principles106 is somewhat
ambivalent. While on the one hand, the principles were
insufficiently rigorous and could mean “all things to all
men,”107 on the other hand, they represent “a contribution of
substance.”108 In particular, the general principles “provide
the fundamental principles for guiding an efficient and
equitable cooperative development of an international
river.”109
When one examines the Treaty in light of these principles
it is clear that both governments accepted them in part, but
not completely.110 For example, between them, Principles 1
and 6 called for an assured plan of operation with the
capacity to ask for additional flood control. The Treaty
accepts this approach. In both cases, the principles
contemplated that the upstream state should be compensated
primarily on the basis of the benefit conferred.111 In relation
to assured flood control, one can see this idea being picked up
in the lump sum payment of $64.4 million. It is also applied
in the on-call scenario pre-2024 through the four one-time
payments, if and when on-call is triggered (as well as
compensatory payments if Canada suffers power losses). At
the time, the on-call payments were interpreted as benefit
sharing provisions.112 Post-2024 there are only compensatory
105. Id. (emphasis added).
106. Krutilla’s assessment focuses more on the power principles than the flood
control principles.
107. Krutilla, supra note 25, at 66.
108. Id. at 67.
109. Id.
110. See A. G. L. McNaughton, The Proposed Columbia River Treaty, 18 Int’l J.
148, 153 (1962) (noting that while the British Columbia and Canadian delegations to
the negotiations accepted that negotiations should be based on the principles the
United States accepted them only as guidelines and not as authoritative
conclusions); see also Swainson, supra note 6, at 132–33 (articulating same), and
Johnson, supra note 6, at 739 (concluding more positively that “[w]ith some
exceptions, [the Treaty] incorporates the fifty-fifty principle and joint development
ideas recommended by the International Joint Commission.”).
111. This point is made clear in Principles 3, 4, and 6, and the commentary to
Principle 6.
112. Senate Ratification Hearings, supra note 21, at 54–55 (describing the pre2024 on call provisions and the compensation therefore as flood control to
600,000cfs; whereas, the assured operation is described as providing control “to
achieve the initial objective of controlling a flood equivalent to that of 1894 to
800,000 cubic feet per second.”). See also Larratt Higgins, Note and Comment, The
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(indemnification) payments and no provisions for sharing the
benefits of called-upon flood control.
2012]

V.

FLOOD CONTROL UNDER THE TERMS OF THE
TREATY AND THE PROTOCOL

The CRT imposes both construction requirements and
operating requirements on Canada. The first section of this
part reviews the construction requirements in the context of
flood control, referring to the facilities and the design
discharge capacity of those facilities. The following three
sections examine successively: (1) the prescribed flood control
operation until 2024, including a summary account of the
Flood Control Operating Plan (FCOP); (2) the on-call
operation until 2024; and (3) the on-call/called upon
operation which will apply after 2024. The focus in each
section is on the treaty terms and conditions taking into
account the modifications to the CRT agreed to during the
negotiation of the Protocol.113 The Appendix to the paper
examines in more detail the implementation of the treaty
flood control provisions through the terms of the FCOP.
A.

Construction Requirements

In order to achieve its obligation to provide 15.5 million
acre-fee of storage usable to improve the flow of the Columbia
River,114 Canada committed to constructing the three Treaty
dams—Duncan, Mica and Arrow—“as soon as possible.”115
Annex A of the CRT (Principles of Operation) specified
certain discharge capacities for those dams to ensure that
they could effectively serve their purpose as flood control
facilities. The Annex prescribed that these dams should have:
3. Sufficient discharge capacity at each dam to afford
the desired regulation for power and flood control . . .
provided through outlet works and turbine

Columbia River Treaty: A Critical View, 16 Int’l J. 399, 399–404 (1961).
113. For an account of those negotiations most of which focused on the
implications of the sale of the downstream benefits, see Swainson, supra note 6, at
ch. 9.
114. Columbia River Treaty, supra note 1, at art. II(1). It is evident that in the
context of the Treaty, “improvement” means improvement principally for the
purposes of power and flood control.
115. Id. at art. II(2)(a)–(c), II(3).
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installations as mutually agreed by the [E]ntities. The
discharge capacity provided for flood control
operations will be large enough to pass inflow plus
sufficient storage releases during the evacuation
period to provide the storage space required. The
discharge capacity will be evaluated on the basis of
full use of any conduits provided for that purpose plus
one half the hydraulic capacity of the turbine
installation at the time of commencement of the
operation of storage under the Treaty.116
4. The outflows will be in accordance with storage
reservation diagrams and associated criteria
established for flood control purposes and with
reservoir-balance relationships established for power
operations. Unless otherwise agreed by the [E]ntities
the average weekly outflows shall not be less than
3000 cubic feet per second at the dam described in
Article II(2)(a) [Mica], not less than 5000 cubic feet
per second at the dam described in Article II(2)(b)
[Arrow/Keenleyside], and not less than 1000 cubic feet
per second at the dam described in Article II(2)(c)
[Duncan]. These minimum average weekly releases
may be scheduled by the Canadian [E]ntity as
required for power or other purposes.117
In terms of operation, and for flood control purposes, the
Treaty distinguishes between flood control operations for the
first sixty years of the Treaty, and flood control operations
after the expiration of sixty years, in 2024. Until 2024, the
United States is entitled to two forms of flood control
operation from Canada: a prescribed annual flood control
operation and an ad hoc, as-may-be-needed on-call operation
under certain specific conditions. This entitlement is
cumulative (i.e. the United States is entitled to both the
prescribed operation, and, where necessary, the on-call
operation) under certain conditions.

116. Id. at Annex A, ¶ 3. BC Hydro is currently installing two additional
generating units at Mica to complement the existing four units with service expected
in 2014. See Press Release, BC Hydro, Mica Generating Station Unites 5 and 6 (Feb.
21, 2011), http://www.el.bchydro.com/mediabulletins/bulletin/system_facilities/mica.
117. Columbia River Treaty, supra note 1, at Annex A, ¶ 4.
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B.

33

The prescribed flood control applies only until 2024 at
which time, as the Treaty is currently framed, it expires
automatically.118 Article IV(2)(a) of the Treaty obliges
Canada to operate 8.45 maf of the total of 15.5 maf of storage
at Mica, Arrow and Duncan in accordance with Annex A of
the Treaty and annual flood control operating plans. Article
IV (2) and Annex A paragraph 5 dedicated flood control
storage in prescribed amounts for the three Canadian Treaty
dams (Mica 0.08 maf, Arrow 7.1 maf, and Duncan 1.27 maf),
but the same paragraphs allow the Canadian Entity to move
some of the dedicated storage space from Arrow to Mica,
provided that “the [E]ntities agree that the exchange would
provide the same effectiveness for control of floods on the
Columbia River at The Dalles, Oregon.”119
The practice under these provisions has been as follows.
First, the Entities themselves immediately agreed to allow
BC Hydro as the Canadian Entity to move 2 maf of the flood
control obligation from Arrow to Mica. This exchange was
reflected in the original 1972 Flood Control Operating
Procedure (FCOP).120 Second, in 1995, the U.S. Entity agreed
to allow an additional exchange from Arrow to Mica, subject
to the Canadian Entity agreeing to augment the storage
space at Mica committed to the assured operation with an
additional 0.5 maf.121 The Assured Operating Procedure
(AOP)122 is modeled on the basis of this new 8.95 maf
118. Both Parties could agree to amend that conclusion which is of course the
basis on which the Entities are considering Option 3.
119. Columbia River Treaty, supra note 1, at Annex A, ¶ 5(d).
120. FCOP 1972, supra note 12.
121. FCOP 2003, supra note 12, at 14. This is referred to (at 25) as the Mica
compensation storage. ENTITIES PHASE 1 REPORT, supra note 4, at 3 & 55–56. This is
actually quite a significant “amendment” to the Treaty since the change serves to
increase the total storage space at Canadians Treaty dams operated to provide
dedicated flood control space from the Treaty prescribed 8.45 maf to 8.95 maf.
122. The terms AOP and DOP are explained in the ENTITIES PHASE 1 REPORT,
supra note 4, at Appendix C. The AOP is:
One of the two reservoir system operating plans prepared each year to
implement the Columbia River Treaty. The Assured Operating Plan is prepared
six years in advance of the actual year of operation and defines the rule curves
and other operating parameters to guide the operation of the system in a
manner that realizes the benefits anticipated by the Treaty. This series of
annual operating plans assures both Entities of the manner of operation of
Canadian storage in advance for the next five years. The AOP establishes the
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allocation, but the Canadian Entity is entitled to suggest a
different allocation during the preparation of the Detailed
Operating Procedure (DOP).123
In return for the assured flood control operation through
2024, the United States agreed to pay Canada a total of $64.4
million124 with actual payments tied to the in-service dates of
the respective facilities.125
1.

The Flood Control Operating Plan (FCOP)

The Appendix to this article offers a detailed account of the
content of the FCOP authorized by the Treaty, but the four
key points are as follows. First, the FCOP establishes flood
control objectives on which the balance of the Plan is
based.126 This fills an essential gap in the Treaty text.
Second, the FCOP prescribes specific operating rules for each
of the three Canadian Treaty dams and Libby.127 The FCOP
is not a flood control plan for the entire Basin or for all major
U.S. projects. Third, the Treaty dams are subject to weekly
control during the evacuation period and daily control during
generation potential of both systems, prescribes operating criteria and
procedures to ensure that the potential will be realized, and serves as the basis
for the Detailed Operating Plan in the actual year of operation. The
downstream power benefits studies are conducted in conjunction with the AOP.
(Treaty Article XIV-2h and Annex A Paragraph 9, Protocol VII). [The DOP is]
similar to the Assured Operating Plan except that it is prepared immediately
prior to each operating year. The DOP is developed from the AOP for that year
and reflects the latest load, resource, flood control, and other pertinent data as
mutually agreed to by the Entities. The DOP serves as a guide and provides
criteria for actual operation of the Canadian storage during the immediately
ensuing operating year. (Treaty Article XIV-2(k))
Copies of all the AOPs and the DOPs available at http://www.nwdwc.usace.army.mil/PB/PEB_08/docAOP.htm
123. FCOP 2003, supra note 12, at 24.
124. See Columbia River Treaty, supra note 1, at art. VI(1) (prescribing the
payment schedule).
125. See id. at art. VI(2) (contemplating a reduction in payment for each month of
delay in the commencement of operations). The Treaty requires Arrow and Duncan
to be fully operational within five years and Mica within nine years of treaty
ratification. Id. at art. IV(6). Two of the facilities (Arrow and Duncan) entered into
service before the prescribed dates and as a result attracted supplementary flood
control benefits as contemplated by paragraph 11 of the Protocol. See Agreement
between the U.S. and Canada effected by Exchange of Notes Relating to the
Columbia River Basin (Flood Control Payments), Washington, August 18 and 20,
1969, 21 UST, part I, at 72 (TIAS 6819).
126. See FCOP 2003, supra note 12, at 8.
127. See generally id. at 21–37.
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the refill period.128 Fourth, while most of the FCOP
provisions deal with the assured flood control operation, the
FCOP contains some provisions that speak to on-call
operations both before and after 2024.129
2012]

2.

Variations to FCOP: The VARQ Operation of Libby

While Libby is included in the FCOP, it is also subject to
domestic operational constraints as a result of biological
opinions issued under the Endangered Species Act (ESA).130
In response to this, and in an effort to provide both improved
fish flows and better assurance of refill, the Corps introduced
the so-called VARQ131 flood control procedure for both Libby
and Hungry Horse.132 In general, VARQ operations permit
less drafting for flood control prior to Spring runoff except in
very high run off years. This has benefits for fish (augmented
flows can be released later in the summer) but also for
recreational interests in Canada because it results in higher
reservoir levels on Lake Koocanusa earlier in the season than
would be the case with standard flood control procedures.
The VARQ procedure is examined in greater detail in the
Appendix.
C.

The On-Call Operation Before 2024

In addition to the assured flood control operation until
2024, the United States is also entitled, on certain terms and
conditions, to an on-call operation of additional storage to
provide further flood control protection. Article IV(2)(b)
obliges Canada to “operate any additional storage in the
Columbia River Basin in Canada, when called upon by” the
U.S. Entity “to meet flood control needs for the duration of
the flood period for which the call is made”133 within the
limits of “existing facilities.”134 The “additional storage” to
which the paragraph refers includes: (1) additional storage at
the three Canadian Treaty dams, (2) storage at other
128. Id. at 38.
129. See id. at 14–15.
130. See supra note 14.
131. VAR is shorthand for variable discharge and Q stands for quantity.
132. See infra Appendix Part II.
133. Columbia River Treaty, supra note 1, at art. IV(2)(b).
134. Id.
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Canadian facilities already built at the time of the Columbia
River Treaty, and, arguably, (3) any subsequently built
storage.
The additional storage at the Canadian Treaty dams is the
storage that is available in addition to storage committed by
Article IV(2) (i.e. 8.45 maf, now 8.95 maf). Thus, Table 1 to
the current FCOP lists a total of 12 maf at Mica, 1.4 maf at
Duncan and 7.1 maf at Arrow comprising both the assured
storage (primary flood control) and the on call storage.135 The
storage at other Canadian facilities includes facilities that
are not owned and operated by the province or by an agent of
the province. It includes, therefore, the Corra Linn facility
currently operated by FortisBC.136
Finally, the commitment appears to extend to storage that
may be built in the Basin after the date of signature or
ratification of the Treaty. This conclusion flows from the use
of the term “any storage” in both Article IV(2)(b) and Article
IV(3). Where the Treaty refers to storage constructed or
operating at a particular time, it does so explicitly.137 That
said, as a matter of practice, very little new storage has been
built in the Basin since the Treaty. For example, Revelstoke
is operated as a run of the river plant and offers limited
additional storage. Similarly, BC Hydro built the Canal Plant
on the Kootenay to take advantage of the additional storage
made available by Libby; it provides no incremental flood
control capacity.138
British Columbia used the Protocol negotiations to try to
limit the ability of the United States to trigger its on-call
entitlements both during the first sixty years and
thereafter.139 Hence, the Protocol establishes that the United
135. FCOP 2003, supra note 12, at tbl.1.
136. Thus Table 1 of FCOP 2003 lists Corra Linn as having available storage of
673,000 but with no entry in the “committed for flood control column” and with the
notation (common to a number of U.S. facilities) that the facility is “[n]ormally
operated to preserve natural lake storage during flood period.” Id.
137. See Columbia River Treaty, supra note 1, at Protocol (1).
138. There would also be significant head losses if storage were made available at
Revelstoke making it a very expensive way of providing flood control. Presumably,
the obligation would also extend to any facilities on the Okanagan branch of the
Columbia although there are no large storage facilities in this branch of the river in
Canada.
139. SWAINSON, supra note 6, at 271–72; see also id. at 258 (Canada’s opening
gambit in the Protocol negotiations was to link calls to a projected 720,000 cfs flow
at The Dalles which the United States rejected in favour of 600,000 cfs “to be

https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjelp/vol2/iss1/1

36

Bankes: The Flood Control Regime of the Columbia River Treaty: Before and

THE FLOOD CONTROL REGIME OF THE COLUMBIA
37
RIVER TREATY
States can only trigger on-call operations “to the extent
necessary to meet forecast flood control needs in the territory
of the United States of America that cannot adequately be
met by flood control facilities in the United States of
America.”140 The paragraph continues, quantifying this
condition with respect to both the initial term (i.e. the first
sixty years) and any subsequent continuation.
Focusing on the initial term, the Protocol provides that the
United States can trigger its on-call entitlement141 only if
there are potential floods that might result in a peak
discharge at The Dalles, Oregon in excess of 600,000 cfs
“assuming the use of all related storage in the United States
of America existing and under construction in January
1961”142 as well as Libby and the subset of Canadian storage
contemplated by Article IV(2)(a)143 of the Treaty. This refers
to the 8.45 maf (now 8.95 maf) of designated storage at Mica,
Arrow and Duncan, as discussed previously. The precondition
of effective use of domestic flood control capacity is discussed
in detail in section 4.
In addition, the Protocol imposed a set of procedural
safeguards on the exercise of the call. These safeguards
contemplate that: (1) the U.S. Entity will consult the
Canadian Entity prior to issuing a call, (2) the Canadian
Entity may within ten days reject or suggest modifications
with supporting considerations, (3) the U.S. Entity must then
review and, if practical, modify or withdraw its call, (4) if
agreement is not reached, the U.S. Entity is to submit the
matter to the Permanent Engineering Board (PEB) and the
Entities are to “be guided” by any “instructions” issued by the
PEB, and (5) in the absence of instructions issued by the
PEB, the U.S. Entity is allowed to renew its call “and the
Canadian [E]ntity shall forthwith honour the request.”144
2012]

consistent with the treaty”).
140. Columbia River Treaty, supra note 1, at Protocol (1).
141. The paragraph also contemplates an alternative i.e. “unless otherwise
agreed” by the Permanent Engineering Board (PEB). Presumably this leaves it open
to the United States to appeal to the PEB to argue that the need to use Canadian
flood control facilities is triggered at a lower discharge rate.
142. Columbia River Treaty, supra note 1, at Protocol (1)(1). For the concern that
the United States might call for Canadian flood control operations in order to
optimize its own storage for power purposes see McNaughton, supra note110, at 163.
143. Columbia River Treaty, supra note 1, at Protocol (1)(1).
144. Id. at Protocol 1(3). One commentator points out that the consequences of
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Because there has yet to be a call, these provisions have yet
to be tested. There is some concern that these procedures will
prove to be unworkable given that twenty days may elapse
between the request for an on call operation and its
initiation.145 The Phase 1 report therefore assumes that any
response to a call will be both assured and immediate.146
The United States pays for on-call storage during the
initial term of the Treaty in accordance with Article VI(3).
First, the United States is required to pay $1.875 million for
each of the first four on-call operations, and, second, the
United States is also required to deliver equivalent power
“lost by Canada” in respect of each of those four operations
and any additional on-call operations.147 Such delivery is to
be made “when the loss of hydroelectric power occurs.”148
An official Canadian government publication issued in
1964 explains how these sums were calculated.149 First, the
premise of the calculations was based on sharing the benefits
conferred by the Canadian storage. This was based on the
projected level of development in the affected parts of the
Basin in 1985 and a reduction of potential floods at The
Dalles to the level of 800,000 cfs.150 Second, the primary
Canadian storage was treated as being of equal value to the
existing U.S. storage of 13 maf and was estimated to confer
an average annual value of $5,700,000 (taking into account
low and high flow years).151 Canada was entitled to half of
that benefit which was evaluated in terms of 1957 dollars
using a discount rate based on the lower U.S. interest rates
rather than Canadian interest rates.152 As for the additional
failing to deliver on flood control operations may be dire, not only in terms of the
human cost but the potential cost to the treasury because of the uncompromising
terms of Article XVIII dealing with liability for damage. See McNaughton, supra
note 110, at 163–65.
145. ENTITIES PHASE I REPORT, supra note 4, at 42.
146. Id. at 42–43.
147. Columbia River Treaty, supra note 1, at art. VI(3).
148. Id.
149. THE COLUMBIA RIVER TREATY AND PROTOCOL: A PRESENTATION, supra note
6, at 85–90. See also Senate Ratification Hearings, supra note 21, at 47–48, 54–55
(statement of Lieutenant General C. Itschner).
150. THE COLUMBIA RIVER TREATY AND PROTOCOL: A PRESENTATION, supra note
6, at 88.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 88–90.
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on call storage, the publication notes that the Parties took a
similar approach—suggesting that if the first four calls for
the operation of additional storage for flood control purposes
were “spaced uniformly over the Treaty period the four
payments will have the same value to Canada [as a series of
annual payments over the sixty years].”153
As for the second part of the compensation rules (requiring
the United States to make Canada whole in terms of foregone
power generation), Article XIV(2) of the Treaty (which deals
with arrangements for implementing the Treaty through the
designated Entities) provides, inter alia, that the Entities
shall be responsible for the “calculation of and arrangements
for delivery of hydroelectric power to which Canada is
entitled for providing flood control.”154
In sum, the United States is currently entitled to an
assured flood operation as well as additional on-call
protection (under certain terms and conditions). Until 2024,
the trigger for on-call protection is a scenario in which the
U.S. Entity anticipates regulated flows at The Dalles in
excess of 600,000 cfs.
2012]

D.

The On-Call/Called Upon Flood Control Operation After
2024

The current position is that the United States
automatically loses the benefits of the prescribed flood
control operation on the sixtieth anniversary of the Treaty in
2024. This will happen unless the two Parties agree to modify
the Treaty rules. Flood control after sixty years is only
available on an on-call/called upon basis as prescribed by
Article IV(3) and as modified by Protocol 1(2). It is helpful to
reproduce the two texts here:155
153. Id. at 88. See text to notes 146 – 151, infra. The bracketed text actually reads
in the volume as follows: “as the annual payments possible.” It does not say what the
annual payments would have been. As for the post-2024 period the Phase 1 Report
notes that no attempt was made to calculate the potential flood control damage that
might result from any of the three options under consideration. ENTITIES PHASE I
REPORT, supra note 4, at 49.
154. Columbia River Treaty, supra note 1, at art. XIV(2)(b).
155. Note as well that it is important to read Protocol (1)(2) in light of the chapeau
to Protocol (1) which provides as follows:
If the United States Entity should call upon Canada to operate storage in the
Columbia River Basin to meet flood control needs of the United States of
America pursuant to Article IV(2)(b) or Article IV(3) of the Treaty, such call
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IV(3). For the purpose of flood control after the
expiration of sixty years from the ratification date,
and for so long as the flows in the Columbia River in
Canada continue to contribute to potential flood
hazard in the United States of America, Canada shall,
when called upon by an entity designated by the
United States of America for that purpose, operate
within the limits of existing facilities any storage in
the Columbia River Basin in Canada as the entity
requires to meet flood control needs for the duration of
the flood control period for which the call is made.
I(2) The United States entity will call upon Canada to
operate storage under Article IV(3) of the Treaty only
to control potential floods in the United States of
America that could not be adequately controlled by all
the related storage facilities in the United States of
America existing at the expiration of 60 years from
the ratification date but in no event shall Canada be
required to provide any greater degree of flood control
under Article IV(3) of the Treaty than that provided
for under Article IV(2) of the Treaty.
After 2024, the on-call operation is the only operation that
the United States is entitled to request. It is intended to be a
complete substitute for both the assured and the pre-2024 oncall operation. The modelling carried out for the Phase 1
Studies suggests that the strongest determinant for the
frequency of U.S. calls on Canadian storage will be the level
of flood protection: either 450,000 cfs or 600,000 cfs at The
Dalles.156 The amount of storage that the United States needs
to call upon, however, will be greater following 2024 in the
treaty termination scenario (Option 2) rather than in a treaty
continuation scenario (Option 1). This is because if the
Treaty continues, the United States is still entitled to
prescribe drafting for an assured power operation. Thus, the
United States would only need to call for a flood control draft
shall be made only to the extent necessary to meet forecast flood control needs
in the territory of the United States of America that cannot adequately be met
by flood control facilities in the United States of America in accordance with the
following conditions:
Columbia River Treaty, supra note 1, at Protocol (1).
156. ENTITIES PHASE I REPORT, supra note 4, at 45. The Report also noted that
there was little difference between treaty termination and treaty continuation
scenarios because the triggering assumptions were the same.
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where potential flooding would call for a deeper draft than
that already provided by the prescribed power operation.157
By contrast, in a treaty termination scenario, there will be no
assured operation at all, thereby creating maximum
uncertainty for the United States.158
The following sections address three questions: (1) what is
the trigger for on-call operation after 2024, (2) what is meant
by the “use of all related facilities” in the United States, and
(3) what is the extent of the duty to compensate for an on-call
operation after post-2024?
2012]

1.

The Trigger for On-Call Operation After 2024

A threshold question to be resolved is when the United
States is entitled to trigger an on-call request after 2024. The
Treaty and the Protocol taken together provide both a
general and a specific threshold for the trigger but both are
silent on the most important element—the flood control
target that is to be used.
The first clause of Article IV(3) of the Treaty establishes a
general threshold: the United States can only require Canada
to provide a flood control operation if “the flows of the
Columbia River in Canada continue to contribute to potential
flood hazard in the United States of America.”159
The next threshold that must be met before a call can be
made is that there must be a “potential flood,”160 “potential
flood hazard”161 or “flood control needs”162 and that such a
flood “could not be adequately controlled by all the related
storage facilities.”163 What does the term “all the related
storage facilities” in the United States mean? A storage
facility will be “related” if it is physically capable of reducing
flows at The Dalles to achieve the targeted level of protection
or “adequate control.” If it cannot make a contribution then it
is not a related facility. In principle, any facility with storage
157. Id. at 42.
158. Id. at 43, 48. The Report concludes that “the volume of Called Upon storage
will generally be less if the Treaty continues after 2024.” Id. at 48.
159. Columbia River Treaty, supra note 1, at art. IV(3). The language here reflects
the possibility of a diversion project reducing the risk of downstream flooding.
160. Id. at Protocol (1)(1).
161. Id. at art. IV(3).
162. Id.
163. Id. at Protocol (1)(2).
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above The Dalles on either the Columbia or any tributary of
the Columbia, including the Kootenai,164 Pend d’Oreille,165
Flathead,166 Clarke Fork and Snake Rivers (and its
tributaries including the Clearwater167) may contribute to
diminished flows. The Willamette joins the Columbia below
The Dalles. But even excluding the facilities on the
Willamette and the Bonneville Dam, which is also
downstream of The Dalles, the FCOP lists some 30 U.S.
facilities in the Columbia Basin Flood Control System.168
Of those 30 facilities listed as having “active storage,” only
eleven are also listed as having storage “[c]ommitted for
[f]lood [c]ontrol.”169 The notations for other facilities include
remarks such as: “[n]ot committed but operated voluntarily
by project owner for flood regulation,” “[c]ontrolled elevation
for normal power operation. May be exceeded involuntarily
during flood period,” and “[n]ormally operated to preserve
natural lake storage during flood period.”170 Most of the
upstream storage on the Snake River (13 maf) is used for
irrigation and is not committed to system wide flood control
although it may be used for local flood control purposes.171
One of the issues that requires further investigation is
whether, post-2024, the United States will need to formally
commit all these additional facilities to flood control before it
164. Libby.
165. Albeni Falls.
166. Hungry Horse.
167. Dworshak.
168. FCOP 2003, supra note 12, at tbl. 1.
169. Id. Note that these are only the facilities listed in FCOP. Further research
would be required to determine if there were additional facilities that could provide
flood control protection and the extent of that protection. Preliminary research
however does suggest that there are such facilities. For example, FCOP makes no
mention of the following dams all of which have flood control as an authorized use or
which have flood control draft elevations prescribed in their license documents.
These facilities include American Falls, Ririe and Minidoka on the Upper Snake and
Mason and Warm Springs on the Middle Snake.
170. Id. See also ENTITIES PHASE I REPORT, supra note 4, at 43, 83 (referring to
drafting of U.S. headwater projects (Libby, Dworshak and Hungry Horse) and the
drafting of Grand Coulee and Brownlee). The Report notes that “[i]t is possible that
other projects may also be able to provide some degree of flood protection, but this
possibility was not investigated in Phase 1.” Id. at 83.
171. Keith W. Muckleston, International Management in the Columbia River
System, UNESCO.org (2003) http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0013/001332/
133292e.pdf at 45 n. 34; confirmed by John Harrison, North West Power and
Planning Council, pers. comm., Dec. 22, 2011.
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will be entitled to call upon Canadian storage.172 The answer
must depend upon whether such facilities are physically
capable of reducing flows at The Dalles. If they are, they
must be put to effective use (or be committed i.e. planned to
be put to effective use) before the United States can trigger a
call. Another possibility is that the United States may need
to prepare an integrated FCOP for its own facilities on the
Columbia and Snake. At present, there is an integrated
FCOP for the Canadian Treaty facilities plus Libby, but there
is no integrated FCOP for the entire system. A good faith
interpretation and application of the Treaty may require the
United States to show, by means of an integrated FCOP, how
and when it will call on Canadian facilities.
But these two thresholds only take us so far. The next
issue is: what is the desired level of control? Is the desired
level of control after 2024 different from before? Both of the
controlling documents, the Treaty and the Protocol, are
surprisingly silent on this crucial question. There are two
competing views. On the one hand, Canada argues that the
flood control objective must be the same as the objective for
on-call operation pre-2024: 600,000 cfs. On the other hand,
the United States believes that the objective (and therefore
the trigger) is 450,000 cfs.
In order to shed some light on this question, it is best to
start with the situation before 2024 and examine both the
assured operation and the on-call operation. On the face of it
there is no reason to confine the analysis to the pre-2024 oncall scenario. The first issue to note when looking at the
assured operation before 2024 is that the Treaty is silent as
to the target level of flood control. The Treaty specifies the
amount of storage for which the United States is entitled to
prescribe an operation but it does not set a target.173 Instead,
the text simply states that Canada shall operate this storage
“[f]or the purpose of flood control”174 and “in accordance with
Annex A and pursuant to flood control operating plans made
thereunder.”175 Neither does Annex A establish any flood
2012]

172. Note in this context that the reference operation for the 2014/2024 Review
applies “effective use procedures” to only eight U.S. reservoirs: Grand Coulee, Libby,
Hungry Horse, Kerr, Albeni Falls, Dworshak, Brownlee and John Day.
173. Columbia River Treaty, supra note 1, at art. IV(2).
174. Id.
175. Id. at art. IV(2)(a).
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control objectives. Instead, Annex A contemplates that the
United States will prepare flood control operating plans.176
Such plans will have a “desired aim,” but the Annex does not
prescribe that “desired aim” other than to note that the
overall goal is “effectiveness for control of floods on the
Columbia River at The Dalles, Oregon.”177
The structure of the Treaty and the Annex leads one to
conclude that the Parties contemplated that it would be up to
the U.S. Entity to propose a flood control protection target as
part of the FCOP. That is what actually happened.178 In
making such a proposal, the U.S. Entity would be required to
act in good faith. Contemporary accounts indicate that the
Parties addressed the anticipated level of protection during
the negotiation of the Treaty. Two sources, one Canadian and
one from the United States confirm the nature of the
discussion.179
176. Id. at Annex A (5).
177. Id. at Annex A (5)(d).
178. See generally FCOP 2003, supra note 12, at app. A.
179. See also IJC PRINCIPLES, supra note 92, at 14, (supporting the 600,000 cfs
level). The academic sources all favour a 600,000 cfs (or higher) target as well.
Professor Albert E. Utton was particularly clear in concluding that 600,000 cfs
provided the effective yardstick for on call flood control both pre- and post-2024.
After discussing the pre-2024 scenario Utton stated:
After the expiration of the sixty year period . . . the United States can call on
Canada for help in controlling floods, when United States storage facilities
cannot reduce the flow to 600,000 cfs at The Dalles.
Thus the objective standard of a flow exceeding 600,000 cfs . . . is provided to
determine when Canada can be called upon to provide flood control storage in
addition to the 8,450,000 acre-feet during the first sixty years of the treaty, and
the same standard is to be applied before Canada supplies any flood control
storage after the sixty years expire. . . . The establishment of this 600,000 cfs
standard . . . was provided . . . to satisfy Canadian concern that she (sic) had no
voice in determining whether a need for additional flood control actually existed.
Canada was also concerned that because of the development of potential flood
areas, calls for flood control storage might become so frequent that they would
interfere with Canadian use of storage, especially for power generation. The set
standard puts an objective unit on when calls can be made regardless of
intervening building and development.
Albert E. Utton, The Columbia River Treaty and Protocol, 1 LAND AND WATER L.
REV. 181, 186–87 (1966) (footnotes omitted). Professor Ralph Johnson was less
discriminating and definitive, commenting:
Under the Protocol, Canada’s control over its own storage facilities is confirmed:
Canadians decide which reservoirs are to release water [for generation]. The
Protocol also makes clear that United States “calls” for flood control storage
shall be made only in emergencies i.e., when the flow at The Dalles, [sic]
Washington exceeds 600,000 [cfs]. In order that Canadian power generation
shall not be unduly disturbed, the United States agrees not to call for Canadian
storage until all its own storage facilities are being used to capacity.
Johnson, supra note 6, at 750–51 (1966). In this article, Johnson does not
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First, the official Canadian “Presentation” document of
1964 suggests that after 2024 the call could be triggered only
if U.S. facilities could not control floods to 600,000 cfs at The
Dalles.180 However, the same document also refers to the
relevant degree of protection as being 800,000 cfs for all three
operations (i.e. assured, pre-2024 on-call and post-2024 on
call).181 At no point does the publication refer to a higher level
of protection such as a 450,000 cfs threshold. Second, and
perhaps of even greater significance, are the comments of
Lieutenant General Itschner during the Senate Ratification
Hearings. General Itschner stated that flood control to an
800,000 cfs level is:
[A]n acceptable and desirable immediate goal for flood
regulation. Regulation to a flow of 600,000 cubic feet
per second is desirable for a further goal in view of the
trends of future flood plain use as well as the
possibility that a considerably larger flood than the
record flood of 1894 might occur.182
General Itschner refers to these targets as the initial and
the ultimate goals. He goes on to say: “[o]f the 15,500,000
acre-feet of Canadian storage, 8,450,000 acre-feet will be
useful for the immediate objective of controlling floods
equivalent to that of 1894 to 800,000 acre-feet.”183 The
balance of the on-call storage is referred to under the heading
of: “[c]ontrol to 600,000 cubic feet per second” and with the
notation that “[s]uch additional storage will be requested
only when there is a threat of a very large flood.”184 This
2012]

distinguish between the positions before and after 2024. W.R. Derrick Sewell,
likewise has little to say on the issue, referring generally to the 600,000 cfs trigger
in the Protocol and without separately discussing whether this applies to the post2024 period as well as the pre-2024 period. W.R. Derrick Sewell, The Columbia
River Treaty and Protocol Agreement, 4 NAT. RESOURCES J. 309, 324 (1964).
However, Sewell also notes that the benefits were calculated on the basis of
controlling floods down to a 800,000 cfs level. Id. at 328–29.
180. THE COLUMBIA RIVER TREATY AND PROTOCOL: A PRESENTATION, supra note
6, at 89 tbl. 7, item 3.
181. Id. The table does not expressly refer to a target number for “operation after
60 years” but read in the context of the previous entries for assured and on call
(primary and secondary) it is clear that it must also be using the same target, 800,
000 cfs at the Dalles.
182. Senate Ratification Hearings, supra note 21, at 53 (statement of Lieutenant
General Itschner).
183. Id. at 53–54.
184. Id. at 55.
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implies that the on-call storage will not be used to control
down to 600,000 cfs but simply to manage the very large
floods down to just below 800,000 cfs. Once again, at no point
does the General (or any other witness at the Hearings)
suggest a more aggressive flood control level than 600,000
cfs—such as 450,000 cfs level of protection.185
In sum, while the Treaty itself does not specify a desirable
flood control target for flows at The Dalles, the Parties seem
to have agreed that the principal target was 800,000 cfs with
600,000 cfs as a desirable target.186 Where then does the idea
of flood control down to a 450,000 cfs target come from? The
only source for this target is the FCOPs themselves.187 Both
the 1972 and 2003 FCOP include the following statement of
both the general flood protection objective and the more
specific statement for The Dalles:
4-1. Basic Flood Protection Objective. The basic
objective for flood regulation is to operate reservoirs to
reduce to non-damaging levels the stages at all
potential flood damage areas insofar as possible, and
to regulate larger floods that cannot be controlled to
non-damaging levels to the lowest possible level with
the available storage space . . . . Canadian storage will
be operated (together with United States storage
projects) to control floods to non-damaging levels
wherever possible, in accordance with the following
objectives.
4-2. Columbia River in the United States. Flooding in
the Columbia River downstream from the mouth of
the Snake River begins when the river reaches [a
specified elevation]. The corresponding flow measured
at The Dalles, Oregon is approximately 450,000 cfs.
Significant damage begins at [a specified elevation].
185. Lieutenant General Itschner offers only a very short discussion of flood
control after the 60th anniversary of the Treaty and does not specifically refer to a
flood control target. Id. Given the context, it is clear that a call would be framed in
terms of the immediate and ultimate goals.
186. The United States has been engaged in a comprehensive Flood Risk
Assessment Management Study. See ENTITIES PHASE 1 REPORT, supra note 4, at 83.
For a description of the study see Raymond Walton et al., The Columbia River
Treaty 2014/2024 Flood Risk Assessment Study Approach, IGEMPORTAL,
http://www.igemportal.org/Resim/07102011143301.pdf (last visited Apr. 29, 2012).
187. See also U.S. ENTITY, SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 5 (“The 450
kcfs objective was selected because it is the current standard for flood control
operations at cited in the FCOP.”).
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The corresponding flow at The Dalles, Oregon is
approximately 600,000 cfs. Because large floods
cannot be regulated to 450,000 cfs, the desired goal is
to control major floods to 600,000 cfs in the lower
Columbia River at The Dalles. Damage commences in
the mid- Columbia area in the vicinity of Hanford,
Washington, when flows reach 400,000 cfs as
measured at the Priest Rapids project. The regulation
required for The Dalles normally will achieve the
desired protection in the mid-Columbia area.188
The balance of the FCOP and actual operating practice
confirms that the assured operation is designed to meet a
flood control target of 450,000 cfs in non-extreme flow years
when this control is possible. The FCOP represents
subsequent practice of the Parties under the Treaty and
suggests that Canada has accepted 450,000 cfs at The Dalles
as the applicable flood control objective in non-extreme years,
at least for the assured operation.189 Expressed in
interpretive terms, the FCOP is “subsequent practice in the
application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of
the parties [the United States and Canada]”190 that the flood
control objective for the assured operation is 450,000 cfs to
the extent that this can be provided but recognizing that this
will not always be possible.
What then is the flood control objective for the additional
storage that Canada is obliged to commit under the terms of
an on-call operation before 2024? Here the Protocol is clear:
the relevant target before 2024 is 600,000 cfs at The Dalles.
In other words, the United States can only make a call if
operation of existing or under construction U.S. storage in
1961, storage at Libby, and assured storage space191 may still
result (taking into account forecast uncertainties) in a flow at
The Dalles greater than 600,000 cfs. The FCOP (1972 and
2003) suggest that the collective storage capacity referred to
above should be adequate to shave 300,000 cfs off the peak.192
2012]

188. FCOP 2003, supra note 12, at 16. The text in FCOP 1972, supra note 12, at
12 is similar.
189. The reference to “subsequent practice” refers to the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, supra note 38, at art. 31(3)(b).
190. Id.
191. This refers to the assured storage at Canadian Treaty dams.
192. FCOP 2003, supra note 12, at app. A.
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Thus, there is broad agreement that prior to 2024, the United
States is only entitled to make a call to supplement assured
storage space where it anticipates unregulated flows at The
Dalles in excess of 900,000 cfs.193
After 2024, the calculation must be restated such that the
United States can only make a call if the anticipated peak
discharge at The Dalles, minus operation of “all related
storage facilities” in the United States existing in 2024, is
unable to reduce the peak at The Dalles to less than X cfs,
where X is either 450,000 cfs or 600,000 cfs. It is important to
note that while the FCOP indicates that the package of
storage referred to in paragraph 1 of the Protocol can reduce
the peak by 300,000 cfs, the FCOP does not provide a similar
calculation for the shaving capacity of “all related [U.S.]
storage facilities.”194
How then should the post-2024 flood control target be
interpreted? The arguments in favour of the 600,000 cfs flow
are as follows. First, while the Treaty is silent regarding the
flood control target, the record shows that the Parties agreed
to an immediate target of 800,000 cfs and that 600,000 cfs
was desirable. Neither the Senate hearings nor the Canadian
“Presentation” document referred to above can be considered
agreements relating to the Treaty or instruments made by
one of the Parties in connection with the conclusion of the
Treaty.195 Given the specificity of the statements made in
these two documents, however, it is inconceivable that the
travaux would not support an interpretation that favours
600,000 cfs (or 800,000 cfs) as a target rather than 450,000
cfs.196
Second, the United States paid for a higher degree of
protection during the first sixty years of the Protocol. It
would be absurd to conclude that the United States can
193. Note that the FCOP carries the reasoning one step further since it translates
forecast runoff volumes into projected flows at The Dalles taking into account the
uncertainties associated with such forecasts especially early in the season. See
generally infra Appendix; FCOP 2003, supra note 12, at app. A.
194. Indeed, we may not be able to determine that with any certainty before 2024
but it must be a crucial element in any effort by the United States to exercise the
called upon power in good faith.
195. Here I refer to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 38,
at art. 31(2)(a) & (b).
196. The travaux would be admissible to show what the Parties would have had in
mind.
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achieve the same or a more stringent level of protection post2024 at a lower cost.197
Third, the caveat in the Protocol to the effect that Canada
cannot be required to provide a greater level of flood control
after 2024 compared to before 2024 must be read as referring
to pre-2024 on-call storage (and not assured plus on-call
storage). This is because the only subject of these paragraphs
of the Protocol is on-call storage. Thus, while Protocol 1(2)
refers generally to Article IV(2) of the Treaty, it must be
noted that the entirety of Protocol 1(2) is covered by the
opening language (the chapeau) of section 1. The opening
language makes it clear that the Parties are only discussing
the scope of the on-call operation, whether triggered under
Article IV(2)(b) (before 2024) or Article IV(3) (after 2024).
Fourth, any examples of practice under the FCOPs in
relation to pre-2024 operations are not relevant to post-2024
operations. This is because the post-2024 operation rests on a
different legal foundation. In particular, the Treaty contains
different compensation provisions for pre-2024 and post-2024
storage.
The arguments in favour of the 450,000 cfs target follow.
First, the Treaty allows the United States to set a flood
control objective through the procedures contemplated in
Annex A. The United States did so in the form of the 1972
and 2003 FCOPs. The FCOPs contemplate regulating flows
to achieve a flow at The Dalles of 450,000 cfs.198 Canada has
accepted the FCOPs (representing a subsequent agreement
or subsequent practice within the meaning of the VCLT199)
and the actual practice under the terms of those FCOPs, for
the use of the flood control space purchased by the United
States for the term of the purchase (sixty years).
Second, where the Parties wished to prescribe a less
demanding flood control objective they did so. They did this
in the context of the pre-2024 on call operation. It would have
been an easy matter to apply the same standard to the post2012]

197. Here Canada might refer to the U.N. Watercourses Convention, see generally
discussion supra Part II.A., which seems to accept the idea that the downstream
state should compensate the upstream state not simply on the basis of covering costs
but also on the basis of sharing the benefits conferred. This might suggest that
Canada’s obligations to operate facilities when it is only receiving its opportunity
costs should be narrowly defined.
198. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 38, art. 31(3)(b).
199. Id at art. 31(3)(a), (b).
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2024 operation, but the Parties chose not to do so. Instead,
the Parties chose to stipulate that Canada cannot “be
required to provide any greater degree of flood control” post2024 than that “provided for under Article IV(2) of the
Treaty.”200 Article IV(2) covers both assured and on-call
storage.201 If the Parties intended to limit Canada’s
obligation to the threshold established for on-call operation,
they should have referred to the flood control protection
committed under Article IV(2)(b).
Third, Article IV(3) gives the United States protection
against “flood hazard” and affords it “flood control.” The text
does not simply give the United States protection from major
floods (i.e. a 600,000 cfs peak discharge). In developing this
interpretation the United States might draw upon the flood
control provisions of the U.N. Watercourses Convention,
which requires the upstream state to take all appropriate
measures to prevent harmful conditions. If, as the FCOP
suggests, damage commences at 450,000 cfs, that is a reason
for preferring this lower figure as the target rather than the
higher 600,000 cfs.
If the United States does trigger a call, then it appears
that it is only entitled to require the operation of enough
Canadian storage to provide reasonable assurance of meeting
the flood control peak flow target at The Dalles (whether
450,000 cfs or 600,000 cfs).202 Other constraints on Canadian
operations may exist. The Phase 1 Report discusses one such
possible constraint pertaining to the conjoint operation of
Mica and Arrow. In a situation where Arrow is held at full
pool, and then required to evacuate to provide flood control
space, it may be necessary both to increase Arrow outflows
(to as much as 100,000 cfs) but also to reduce Mica flows to a
minimum, including generation flows.203 The Phase 1 Report
200. Columbia River Treaty, supra note 12, at Protocol (1)(2).
201. Id.
202. See ENTITIES PHASE 1 REPORT, supra note 4, at 47–48, 61, 62 (discussing the
called-upon storage volumes that may be required at the different Canadian
facilities).
203. Id. at 55–56. This could occur in both the treaty termination and treaty
continuation scenarios. In the treaty termination scenario BC Hydro can exercise a
lot of discretion over Arrow levels. As noted above (see supra note 53), BC Hydro will
likely seek to operate Arrow at full pool subject only to meeting local flood control
requirements. But even in a treaty continuation scenario, the current rules allow for
the so-called flex operation, which allows Canada to manage individual projects as it
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comments that: “It is unlikely that Mica could be reduced to
minimum flow in winter without a very high risk to BC
Hydro power reliability and risk of impacts to non-power
requirements.”204 The later the request for on call storage,
the more drastic the required response.
2012]

2.

What is Meant by the Use of All Related Storage
Facilities in the United States?

In an on call-setting, whether before or after 2024, the
Protocol makes it clear that the United States can only make
a call to the extent that its own facilities cannot meet the
flood control objective without assistance. In general, this
will mean that U.S. facilities will need to draft deeper than
might be required when the United States can rely on an
assured flood control operation from Canada.205 This in turn
may mean that U.S. facilities fail to refill in some years and
operate at a lower head with resulting power losses.206 It may
also mean that there is less water available for other
purposes including irrigation, navigation and fish flows.
Domestic flood control capacity may depend on a number of
variables with respect to particular facilities. First, the
facility must be operational. If a facility has been
decommissioned, presumably it is not a related facility within
the meaning of the Protocol. Second, all facilities are subject
to operating constraints and may have limited discharge
capacity. In some cases, problems with turbines may reduce
discharge capacity if they cannot be used for some reason.
Presumably, all of this might reasonably be taken into
account in assessing the capacity of U.S. flood control
facilities to meet its own domestic target. Third, facilities
may also be under some legal constraints. Some such legal
sees fit so long as the flow at the border is that prescribed by the relevant operating
plan.
204. Id. at 56. But the United States may well respond that the Treaty imposes an
obligation of conduct and does not afford Canada much leeway in avoiding that
obligation if properly triggered. But that of course takes us back to the precise
nature of the United States obligation to make effective use of its facilities for flood
control purposes.
205. Id. at 53.
206. It does not seem unreasonable to suggest that the United States will have an
incentive to minimize the obligations associated with effective use, especially if the
costs of compensating Canada for an on call operation are lower than the costs
incurred by an effective use operation.
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constraints are obvious and include maximum elevations
established for engineering and safety reasons. But other
conditions may be established for environmental or ecological
reasons. Such conditions may limit the capacity to use a
facility for flood control purposes. The question for present
purposes is whether the United States is entitled to rely on
such obligations in assessing whether it has made effective
use of its own facilities to achieve the desired level of flood
control and before triggering an on-call obligation.207
The Phase 1 Report did not take account of such additional
constraints but such constraints were considered as part of
the U.S. Entity’s supplemental report.208 One general result
of regulating storage and flows to meet Bi-Op requirements
rather than flood control requirements is that reservoir levels
will generally be held higher given the importance attached
to reservoir refill to allow fish releases later in the
summer.209 The VARQ operation of Libby and Hungry Horse
provides one such example of a modified flood control
operation in order to deliver environmental benefits. The
VARQ operation is discussed in the Appendix to the paper.
The key legal question is whether the United States is
allowed to rely on operations directed by the Endangered
Species Act, Biological Opinions (ESA Bi-Ops) in assessing
what amounts to the effective use of its facilities before it is
entitled to trigger an on-call operation.210 The Treaty has
207. A variation on this argument is discussed above in the context of the amount
of live storage that the United States has actually committed to flood control. See
text to notes 162 et seq.
208. U.S. ENTITY, SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 2.
209. Id. at 25, 29, 33. Higher reservoir levels may deliver some benefits to Canada
in relation to Libby since Lake Koocanusa is valued in Canada for its recreational
benefits which are only realized when Libby is a at full pool during the recreational
season. Table 3-14 in the ENTITIES PHASE 1 REPORT, supra note 4, at 53 suggests
that Libby will have to draft on average an additional 47.2 feet on April 30 to meet
effective use flood control requirements rather than VARQ.
210. There are clearly similarities between the issue as stated here and the
dispute that arose between Canada and the United States in relation to the
operation of Libby following the listing of Kootenai sturgeon under the ESA. That
dispute was ultimately “settled” by the terms of the Libby Coordination Agreement.
THE U.S. ENTITY FOR THE COLUMBIA RIVER TREATY, RECORD OF DECISION, LIBBY
COORDINATION
AGREEMENT
(Feb.
15
2000),
available
at
http://www.bpa.gov/corporate/pubs/rods/2000/Libby_Coordination_Agreement.pdf
[hereinafter LIBBY COORDINATION AGREEMENT RECORD OF DECISION]. For discussion
of the background to this dispute, which nearly went to arbitration, see Bankes,
supra note 6, at 83–92.
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very little to say about these matters. Annex A of the Treaty
contemplates that the United States might have a say in the
operational limits (e.g., discharge capacity) for the Canadian
Treaty facilities, but it does not extend this review to the
licensing conditions that might apply to those facilities. The
applicable principle of international law is that a state
cannot rely upon its domestic laws to avoid or qualify its
obligations.211 This principle might suggest that the United
States should not be allowed to rely upon ESA obligations, for
example, to limit the use of existing facilities for flood control
purposes, and thereby more readily trigger Canada’s on-call
obligations. On the other hand, it might be argued that
Canada would have known that all storage facilities would be
licensed, and that license terms and conditions might limit
the use of facilities under certain circumstances. Further, it
might be argued Canada would have known that operational
limits for the ESA are really no different from other forms of
operational limits, and that these limits should be taken into
account in interpreting the open textured language of the
Protocol.212
2012]

3.

Compensation for On-Call Operations Post-2024

As noted above, the compensation due to Canada for an oncall operation is expressed differently for the post-2024
period than for the pre-2024 period. Under Article VI(4) (the
applicable provision for post-2024 called-upon operations),
Canada is entitled to be compensated for all the operating
costs incurred by Canada in providing the flood control. It is
also entitled to “compensation for the economic loss to
211. ILC Articles on State Responsibility, second reading, Article 3, as reproduced
in JAMES CRAWFORD, THE INT’L LAW COMMN’S ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY:
INTRODUCTION, TEXT AND COMMENTARIES (2002); Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, supra note 38, at art. 27.
212. One can think of this as an evolutive interpretation of the Treaty to account
for changing values. See Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.), Judgment,
1997 I.C.J. 92 ¶ 140 (Sept. 25); Iron Rhine Railway (Belg. v. Neth.), Hague Ct. Rep.
(Scott) ¶¶ 79-244 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2005). More generally on evolutive interpretation
(especially attractive in the area of human rights), see 40 YEARS OF THE VIENNA
CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES supra note 69, at 55–95. Further research
might be required on this point. The research would need to examine the licenses for
U.S. facilities as they stood at the time the Treaty was negotiated. This would
inform the reasonable expectations of the Parties as to the scope of the United
States’ duty to use the flood control capacity of its facilities and the types of
limitations that were typically included at the time.
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Canada arising directly from Canada foregoing alternative
uses of the storage used to provide the flood control.” Article
VI(5) indicates that Canada may elect to receive
compensation under this latter head in power. The formula is
perhaps more generous than during the initial period since it
refers to the compendious term “economic loss.” In addition,
the loss is expressed in terms of foregoing alternative uses,
which might include storage and later release at times of
higher demand. This may mean, for example, that a reservoir
drawn down for flood control never achieves re-fill with the
implication that turbines operate with a lower head and
therefore less efficiently over a long period. Furthermore,
there may simply be less water to generate power at times of
peak demand, which may be later that summer (to
accommodate air conditioning and cooling demand) or the
following winter.
Article VI(3) (which applies to on-call flood control until
2024), by contrast, suggests that the only form of
compensation payable for on-call flood control is delivery of
equivalent lost power where “delivery [is] to be made when
the loss of hydroelectric power occurs.”213 It will also be
necessary for the Parties to resolve a number of other
matters before the on-call provisions can be operationalized.
The Phase 1 Report of the Entities notes that the Parties will
need to agree on when on-call is initiated, when it concludes,
and how soon thereafter it is possible to determine that
Canadian reservoirs have returned to their planned
operation.214
One of the issues that the CRT does not deal with is the
allocation of the compensation obligation within the United
States—both the obligation to deliver power and the
obligation to compensate for economic losses. Allocation has
not been an issue during the first fifty years of the Treaty’s
operation for two reasons. First, the lump sum payment
would have been authorized by the original approval of the
Treaty, as presumably were the contingent four on-call
payments. Second, because there has been no on-call
operation, it has been unnecessary for the Parties to work
213. Columbia River Treaty, supra note 1, at art. IV(3) (alteration in original).
ENTITIES PHASE 1 REPORT, supra note 4, at 49 (noting that the Entities did not
attempt to calculate the economic losses associated with called upon operations).
214. ENTITIES PHASE 1 REPORT, supra note 4, at 81.
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through how the power delivery obligations would work. But,
as the Parties move forward from 2024, these issues will
become more challenging. Because resolution of these issues
principally involves questions of U.S. domestic law, I will
leave further exploration and analysis of these allocation
issues to others.215
As already noted, in the post-2024 period there is no
provision for an additional amount to be paid for each call or
for the first number of calls (as there is for the first four pre2024 calls). This gives rise to two comments. First, it is clear
that the first four “call” payments cannot be carried forward
post-2024 if less than four calls have been made prior to that
time. This is because Article VI is structured so that the
Treaty creates two distinct flood control compensation
regimes, one that applies prior to 2024 and one that applies
post 2024. Second, the absence of additional payments
suggests that the post-2024 regime is strictly a compensatory
regime and not a benefits (avoided costs) sharing regime such
as that contemplated by the IJC Flood Control Principles.
Thus, post-2024, the United States must make Canada
whole, but is not required to make any additional payment
for the existence of the upstream storage and the value of the
contingent right to make a call.216 There is no quid pro quo
for this contingent right other than the “make whole”
2012]

215. See McKinney, supra note 18, at 320 (opining that post-2024 the U.S.
Congress “would have to authorize additional payments to Canada for providing any
requested flood control measures”). Note that concurrently with the Treaty
agreements and especially the Protocol, the mainstem dam owners in the United
States negotiated the Canadian Entitlement Allocation Agreements to establish how
the obligation to pay for the Canadian entitlement was to be allocated between
mainstem federal projects and non-federal projects (Wells, Rocky Island, Rocky
Reach, Wanapum and Priest Rapids). The agreements provided for an allocation of
72.5% to federal projects and 27.5% to the non-federal projects. These agreements
would have expired beginning in 1998 with the return of the entitlement but were
extended to 2024. Canadian Entitlement Allocation Extension Agreements, Record
of Decision, Apr. 29, 1997. So far as I am aware these agreements dealt with the
power benefits and obligations and did not deal with flood control issues.
216. The IJC Principles and text following are quite clear in suggesting that in a
cooperative development scenario there should be both compensation for loss of
power and compensation for damages prevented (i.e., the benefit conferred). IJC
PRINCIPLES, supra note 10. However, the Canadian presentation on The Columbia
River Treaty and Protocol does suggest that the advantageous discount rate secured
by Canada “is such that the value of the payments can be considered as being in
excess of the total value of annual flood control payments made in perpetuity.” THE
COLUMBIA RIVER TREATY AND PROTOCOL: A PRESENTATION, supra note 6, at 90; see
also id. at 97–100.
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obligation. In addition, the absence of some additional
sharing of the benefit conferred may mean that Canada will
have a particular interest in ensuring that the United truly
has committed all of its available storage.
It bears reiterating that the post-2024 on-call flood control
provisions will continue to apply even if one party gives the
minimum ten years notice to terminate the Treaty in 2014
(or later), thereby triggering actual termination in 2024 (or
later). This is because Article XIX (dealing with termination
of the Treaty and the duration of the Treaty) provides that
Article IV(3) (the post-2024 on call operation) and Article
VI(4) and (5) (the post-2024 compensation provisions) will
continue to apply until the end of the useful life of the
facilities covered by Article IV(3) or until a flood control
threat of the magnitude contemplated in the Treaty and the
Protocol ceases to exist.217 One of the issues that is not clear
is the extent to which other elements of the Treaty and
Protocol that are not expressly mentioned will also continue.
For example, the flood control provisions of the Protocol refer
expressly to the PEB—will that institution continue as well?
While there is much that will need to be worked out, the
principle that will apply is evident: i.e., as much as necessary
of the CRT and Protocol will be continued so as to ensure
that the on-call obligations are effective.218
In sum, post-2024, the United States may only request oncall protection on certain terms and conditions. It will no
longer be able to require an assured flood control operation.
The United States must pay for the protection provided by
the on-call operation based upon the opportunity cost of that
storage and must make Canada whole. The United States is
not required to share the benefits of the protection afforded
by the on-call obligation and may only trigger the on-call
obligation if it has satisfied certain conditions precedent and
certain procedural safeguards.
The precise trigger for the on-call operation post-2024 is
contentious both with respect to the target (450,000 cfs or
600,000 cfs) and with respect to the scope of the United
States’ obligation to make effective use of its own storage

217. Columbia River Treaty, supra note 1, at art. XIX(4).
218. Iron Rhine Railway (Belg. v. Neth.), Hague Ct. Rep. (Scott) ¶¶ 84-223 (Perm.
Ct. Arb. 2005).
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facilities. The contemporary record clearly suggests that flood
control target was not to be any lower than 600,000 cfs. By
contrast, actual practice under the FCOP favours the lower
target for the use of the 8.45 maf of assured flood control but
that practise while relevant to understanding the
construction and interpretation of the assured operation is of
limited or no utility in relation to the interpretation of the
post-2024 called upon operation. This is simply because a
practice that shows an agreed interpretation of Treaty
Provision A (the assured operation) cannot be authoritative
as showing an agreed interpretation of Treaty Provision B
(the called upon operation)—especially when that provision
does not become operative until 2024.
2012]

VI. CONCLUSION
Flood control is one of the two main objectives of the
Columbia River Treaty. Indeed, flood control holds the trump
card in actual treaty operations. At present, and indeed until
2024, Canadian Treaty dams provide assured flood control to
the United States. The Treaty requires Canada to operate
8.45 maf (now 8.95 maf) of storage in those dams on the basis
of flood control operating plans proposed by the United
States and agreed to by Canada. These plans aim to control
flows to achieve basin-wide and local flood control objectives,
the most important of which is that flows at The Dalles
should not exceed 450,000 cfs during non-extreme years.
During extreme flow years, the Treaty also provides the
United States with an insurance policy insofar as it allows
the United States to call upon Canada to operate all
additional available storage in order to respond to a major
flood, and to ensure that flows at The Dalles do not exceed
600,000 cfs. The United States has never exercised this
option.
The flood control operation contemplated by the Treaty
changes automatically in 2024. After 2024 the United States
is no longer entitled to an assured annual flood control
operation. It is, however, still entitled to an on-call or called
upon operation which will apply to all available Canadian
storage but it can only exercise this option if its own facilities
cannot deliver the desired level of flood control protection.
Neither the Treaty nor the Protocol is completely clear as to
what that desired level of flood control protection might be.
According to one view the level of flood control protection to
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which the United States is entitled is based on flows at The
Dalles no greater than 600,000 cfs. According to another
view, the desired level of protection remains the same as it is
now (i.e., 450,000 cfs). In this latter view, therefore, the
United States can trigger on-call flood control post-2024
whenever the use of domestic U.S. storage is forecast to be
inadequate to maintain a regulated flow at The Dalles below
450,000 cfs.
While this is one important disagreement between the
Entities, there will likely be other equally or more important
differences as well. For example, it seems likely that the
United States and Canada may have different views as to the
extent to which multiple use dams, especially those used for
irrigation purposes, should have to be drafted before the
United States can call upon Canadian storage. Similarly,
there may be differences as to the extent to which the United
States may rely on obligations under the ESA to limit the
scope of its effective use obligations. These differences of
opinion will need to be resolved prior to 2024, and it seems
likely that these differences will push both the Entities and
the two governments to explore option three—renegotiating
some aspects of the Treaty to provide for continuation of
some form of an assured flood control operation on agreed
terms and conditions.
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APPENDIX: THE FLOOD CONTROL OPERATING
PLANS
This appendix offers a detailed description and analysis of
the Flood Control Operating Plan (FCOP). The three sections
of the appendix describe: (1) FCOP in the context of assured
flood control operations, (2) the variation of FCOP (VARQ
FC) as applied to Libby, and (3) FCOP in the context of on
call operations.
I.

THE COLUMBIA RIVER TREATY FLOOD CONTROL
OPERATING PLAN – ASSURED OPERATIONS

Paragraph 5 of Annex A of the Treaty provides that the
U.S. Entity “will submit flood control operating plans which
may consist of or include flood control storage reservation
diagrams and associated criteria for each of the dams.” The
paragraph goes on to provide that “[t]he Canadian [E]ntity
will operate in accordance with these diagrams or any
variation that the entities agree will not derogate from the
desired aim of the flood control plan.” While Annex A
contemplates that the U.S. Entity will prepare and submit
the FCOP, paragraph 2 of the Protocol provides that:
In preparing the flood control operating plans in
accordance with paragraph 5 of Annex A of the
Treaty, and in making calls to operate for flood control
pursuant to Articles IV(2)(b) and IV(3) of the Treaty,
every effort will be made to minimize flood damage in
both Canada and the United States of America.
The first draft of the FCOP for Treaty storage was
developed by a joint Entity task force established in 1965.219
The U.S. Entity was represented by the North Pacific
Division of the Corps of Engineers (Corps), the Bonneville
Power Administration and the Bureau of Reclamation, the
Canadian Entity was represented by BC Hydro. The FCOP
was prepared in draft form by 1968 and the task force
dissolved. The Corps revised the draft in 1971 and the
revised version was reviewed by the Columbia River Treaty
Operating Committee in 1972. The Operating Committee is

219. This history is recounted in the 1972 and 2003 FCOPs. FCOP 1972, supra
note 12; FCOP 2003, supra note 12.
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comprised of representatives of the Entities and is
responsible for preparing and implementing the assured and
detailed operating plans to give effect to the FCOP.220
Revisions to the 1972 Plan were made in 1999 and the
current version of the FCOP was adopted in May 2003.
The FCOP provides a useful statement of the objective of
flood control regulation:221
The basic objective for flood regulation is to operate
reservoirs to reduce to non-damaging levels the stages
at all potential flood damage areas in Canada and the
United States insofar as possible, and to regulate
larger floods that cannot be controlled to nondamaging levels to the lowest possible level with the
available storage space.
There are five elements to flood control regulation: (1)
“forecasts for seasonal runoff volumes and daily
streamflows[,]” (2) storage diagrams defining the flood
control storage space required, (3) procedures to develop flood
control targets for the Lower Columbia (as measured at The
Dalles, Oregon), (4) “procedures to guide refill of flood control
space[,]” and (5) “local flood control operating criteria and
project operating limits[.]”222
The FCOP establishes some numeric targets associated
with damaging flows in both the United States and Canada
for the Columbia River and for the Kootenai (Kootenay)
River. The targets are typically expressed in the form of river
levels and in some cases are also expressed in terms of
corresponding flows. Appendix A to the Entities’ Phase I
report provides a useful summary in tabular form:223

Flood Control Objectives in Canada

220. Columbia River Treaty, supra note 1, at art. XIV (2)(h).
221. FCOP 2003, supra note 12, at 8, 16.
222. Id. at 8.
223. ENTITIES PHASE 1 REPORT, supra note 4, at A-4 to A-5 (references omitted).
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Major Damage

Revelstoke

Castlegar
Trail

Creston
Nelson

61

Damage
Commences

1,450 ft
(200 kcfs with Arrow @
El 1446 ft
1405 ft
1400 ft
1,352 ft
1,347 ft @ old
280 kcfs
highway
bridge
225 kcfs @
Birchbank
1,763 ft
1,759 ft
1,755 ft

Flood Control Objectives in the United States
Major Damage

Vancouver,
Washington

Bonners
Ferry,
Idaho
Hanford,
Washington
(mid
Columbia)

Flood Stage as Defined by
the
National Weather Service
24 ft NGVD
17.8 feet NGVD
22.2 ft Columbia 16 feet, Columbia River
River Datum
Datum
600 kcfs @ The 450 Kcfs @ The Dalles
Dalles
1,774 feet NGVD
1,764 ft NGVD
(~50kcfs when Kootenay
Lake is at 1750 ft NGVD)
400 kcfs as measured at
the Priest
Rapids project

A key goal of the FCOP is to control flows at The Dalles
based on the target of 450 kcfs, but higher controlled flows
may be established as a target “to prevent storage space from
filling too soon, thus resulting in damaging uncontrolled
flows in the lower Columbia.”224 The basic annual flood

224. FCOP 2003, supra note 12, at 10. The idea here is that it may be necessary to
provide for higher releases from facilities now, rather than face a situation where
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control operation calls for a reservoir evacuation period and a
reservoir refill period. Reservoirs are typically close to full at
the end of the summer and drafted during the winter for
power purposes, with further drafting as necessary to provide
storage space for spring runoff. The time by which storage
space is to be made available varies between February 28
and April 30 for two main reasons: “1) to arrange orderly
drawdown to avoid requiring all projects to release high
outflows in the same short period, thereby potentially
causing unintended regulated flood; and 2) to follow the
natural runoff pattern; e.g., the highest-elevation project’s
runoff starts later. . ..”225
In order to ensure that this target can be achieved in an
orderly manner and consistent with project operating limits,
evacuation of reservoirs will begin by either December 1 or
January 1.226 Refill commences either to meet system flood
control or to meet assured refill criteria or other agreed
objectives.227
The FCOP established five categories of reservoirs in the
Columbia River system: (1) reservoirs operating under fixed
releases to provide flood control of the lower Columbia, (2)
reservoirs operated for tributary flood protection with
incidental flood regulation for the lower Columbia, (3) major
natural lakes, (4) reservoirs with variable releases for flood
control in the lower Columbia, and (5) run of the river
projects.228 There is nothing in the Treaty or the Protocol that
requires the burden of flood control to be allocated fairly,
equitably, or indeed even preferentially, as between different
dams within the same category—at least until 2024.229 Post2024 the United States must preferentially draft U.S. storage
facilities since the United States is not entitled to call on
Canadian storage until it has made full use of its own
storage.
storage facilities fill rapidly and are then discharging at full capacity and engaging
in uncontrolled spill.
225. ENTITIES PHASE 1 REPORT, supra note 4, at A-7.
226. FCOP 2003, supra note 12, at 9.
227. Id. at 10.
228. Id. at 11-13, tbl. 1.
229. Id. at 34 (acknowledging that the CRT “does not elaborate on how to
prioritize the draft of Libby and Duncan during trapped storage conditions”); see also
McNaughton, supra note 110, at 163.
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The first category of reservoirs refers to large upstream
facilities that, because of travel times, cannot be operated on
a daily basis to provide effective flood control in the lower
Columbia. Release volumes for these reservoirs are based on
forecast runoff. Adjustments may be required in some
instances to provide local flood protection. The reservoirs in
this category include the Canadian Treaty dams at Mica (12
maf) and Duncan (1.4 maf), the Libby project (5 maf) and
Hungry Horse (3 maf) and Dworshak (2 maf).230 The second
category is of less interest here since all of the relevant
facilities are in the United States. The third category
includes Kootenay Lake, which is regulated by Corra Linn
dam (0.7 maf), while the fourth category includes Arrow (7.1
maf) and Grand Coulee (5.2 maf). Reservoirs in this fourth
category have relatively short travel times to the lower
Columbia and thus can be used to produce desired flows at
The Dalles as well as provide local flood control protection.
The other two reservoirs in the fourth category, Grand
Coulee and John Day, are both in the United States.
Section 10 of FCOP provides that its implementation is the
responsibility of the CRT Operating Committee.231 Both
sections are responsible for assembling the necessary data,
but it is the U.S. Section, following consultation with the
Canadian section, which “will determine the flood control
storage space requirements during the Flood Control Storage
Evacuation period, calculate Flood Control Refill Curves, and
determine day-to-day reservoir operation for flood control
during the refill period in accordance with these curves” and
it is the Corps that will be responsible for “issuing
instructions.”232 During the evacuation period, instructions
will generally be issued on a weekly basis leaving it to the
Canadian Section to “determine the daily distribution of
these weekly storage releases to each Canadian storage
project.”233 In low runoff years, daily control may be
unnecessary and may be replaced by weekly releases subject
to the caveat that “daily control of individual Canadian
2012]

230. Id. at tbl. 1 (listing facilities by category, bracketed numbers refer to active
storage committed to flood control (rounded); the numbers for the Canadian Treaty
dams include both primary flood control (assured) and on-call storage).
231. Id. at 38–41.
232. Id. at 38.
233. Id. at 38.
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storage projects may be initiated at any time by the United
States Section if changed conditions so warrant.”234
In order to further operationalize the flood protection
objectives, the FCOP provides more specific operating rules
for each of the Treaty dams, including Libby. The FCOP does
not prescribe flood control operations at other United States
dams such as Grand Coulee. Operations for these reservoirs
are prescribed in reservoir-specific Water Control Manuals.235
The specific operating rules for each reservoir contain
sections dealing with: (1) operations during evacuation, (2)
operations during refill, (3) flood control refill curves, and (4)
project operating limits. The section on operating limits
(which deals with matters such as maximum pool elevations,
discharge rates and ramping rates) contains a different rider
for Libby than the standard rider for the Canadian Treaty
dams. For the latter dams, the FCOP provides that
“operating limits may be modified or added to from time to
time as agreed by the Entities.”236 However, in the case of
Libby the provision simply states that “operating limits may
be modified or added to from time to time.”237 This difference
recognizes the reality that the operating limits for the
Canadian Treaty dams were effectively agreed upon as part
of the preparation of the first FCOP as contemplated by
Annex A, paragraph 5 of the CRT. By contrast, the CRT
authorizes Libby but has relatively little to say about the way
in which Libby is operated.238
Arrow. Arrow is a Category IV reservoir.239 Controlled
storage at Arrow begins two days prior to the time that the
unregulated discharge is forecast to exceed the initial
controlled flow (ICF).240 Refill at Arrow is coordinated with
refill at the other two Category IV projects (Grand Coulee
234. Id.
235. ENTITIES PHASE 1 REPORT, supra note 4, at A-2.
236. FCOP 2003, supra note 4 at 24 (Arrow); id. at 28 (Mica); id. at 31 (Duncan).
237. Id. at 33.
238. A combination of Article XII (5) and (6) of the Treaty and paragraph 5 of the
Protocol requires the United States to cooperate on a continuous basis in operating
Libby so as to coordinate with Canadian downstream hydroelectric facilities.
Columbia River Treaty, supra note 1, at art. XII & Protocol (5).
239. FCOP 2003, supra note 12, at 22.
240. ICF is term defined in Appendix B of the 2003 FCOP. FCOP 2003, supra note
12 app. B. In essence, it refers to the point at which flows are controlled for the first
time during the runoff season in order to reach a targeted flow at The Dalles.
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and John Day). For Canada, this coordination means that the
Canadian Entity will be permitted to achieve local flood
objectives (e.g., protection of Trail) by refilling Arrow at a
faster rate than would be necessary to protect lower
Columbia flood interests. When this refill happens,
“appropriate adjustments will be made at other Category IV
projects to compensate for this effect.”241 This section of the
FCOP also establishes the operating limits for the Arrow
Project as a minimum average weekly flow of 5,000 cfs, a
maximum ramping rate of 25,000 cfs per day “unless a larger
change is necessary to accomplish the objectives of the plan,”
and maximum and minimum reservoir elevations although
making provision for exceedance in maximum flood years
(based on the 1894 flood year).242 Finally, acknowledging the
potential for winter flooding in the lower Columbia, the
Arrow project is to be operated where necessary to ensure
that, so far as possible, the “outflow will not exceed the
natural lake outflow which would have occurred prior to the
construction of Arrow or Mica . . ..”243 No more than 250,000
acre-feet of storage is to be obligated for this operation and
this storage may be attained by exceeding the normal full
pool elevation as is the case for maximum flood years.244
Mica. Mica is a category I reservoir.245 The Mica flood
control operation commences as specified by the Corps “based
on the timing and magnitude of the runoff, and the duration
of the operation will be determined by the daily accumulation
of the amount of water stored.”246 The operating limits for
Mica include a maximum discharge capacity as agreed in a
1967 report on Mica Discharge Capacity; a minimum average
weekly outflow of 3,000 cfs and a normal full pool elevation
(2,475 feet) and a minimum elevation of 2,320 (difference 155
feet).247 Mica is subject to the same obligation as Arrow in
relation to the risk of winter flooding (i.e., insofar as possible
2012]

241. FCOP 2003, supra note 12, at 23. This is a concrete illustration of paragraph
2 of the Protocol, which provides that in preparing FCOPs and making calls, “every
effort will be made to minimize flood damage both in Canada and the United States
of America.” Columbia River Treaty, supra note 1, at Protocol (2).
242. FCOP 2003, supra note 12, at 24.
243. Id. at 26.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 27.
246. Id. at 28.
247. FCOP 2003, supra note 12, at 28.
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outflows should be no greater than natural lake outflows).248
Duncan. Duncan is a Category I reservoir.249 Refill at
Duncan commences ten days before the unregulated
discharge is forecast to exceed the ICF, at which time the
mean daily outflow will be reduced to 100 cfs. Discharge
capacity at Duncan was agreed upon in 1966 and the normal
maximum outflow is 10,000 cfs, with ramping rates no
greater than 4,000 cfs per day, unless a larger change is
necessary to accomplish FCOP objectives.250
Libby. Libby is also a Category I reservoir and, as with
Duncan, storage for flood control is to commence ten days
before the unregulated discharge is forecast to exceed the
ICF.251 Libby is also subject to minimum outflows of 4,000 cfs
with ramping rates controlled such that tailwater changes do
not exceed one foot per hour or four feet per day from May to
September or one foot per half-hour or six foot per day from
October to April.252
Article XII(6) of the Treaty requires that Libby be operated
so as to respect the IJC’s levels order for Kootenay Lake.253
This may require Libby or Duncan, or both, to reduce
outflows which in turn may result in either or both dams not
reaching flood control space requirements by the end of the
evacuation period which results in a condition referred to in
the FCOP as trapped storage (i.e., water trapped above the
flood control rule curve).254 In deciding on an appropriate
drafting priority as between the two facilities, the FCOP
delineates a number of factors that the Operating Committee
should take into account in developing a real-time regulation
plan on a case by case basis. These factors include local flood
protection needs but also, as a second priority, other factors
248. Id. at 29.
249. Id. at 30.
250. Id. at 30–31.
251. Id. at 32.
252. Id. at 33.
253. Columbia River Treaty, supra note 1, at art. XII(6). The Corra Linn dam has
some control over the level of Kootenay Lake (although a natural obstacle, Grohman
Narrows also limits outflows). Backwater effects of high Kootenay Lake levels
influence the level of the Kootenay River at Bonners Ferry. Article XII(6) of the CRT
requires that the operation of Libby be “consistent with” the IJC levels ordered for
Kootenay Lake. Id. For discussion of the Kootenay levels order, see Bankes, supra
note 6, at 11–14.
254. FCOP 2003, supra note 12, at app. B.
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such as hydropower generation, fish habitat, water quality,
recreation, and at site operating limits.255 The FCOP also
provides guidance to the Entities as to how to work off the
trapped storage so as to avoid filling the reservoirs too early
while trying to avoid local flooding.256
The FCOP provisions on the operation of Libby do not refer
to VARQ (discussed in the next section).257
2012]

II.

THE INTRODUCTION OF VARQ AT HUNGRY
HORSE AND LIBBY

The above describes standard flood control procedures.
These procedures have been modified to some degree for U.S.
facilities as a result of the application of the Endangered
Species Act (ESA)258 and the listing of various species of fish
as threatened or endangered under that Act.259 In particular,
beginning in the 1990s, the Corps and Reclamation have
been required to provide releases from Basin dams during
the summer months to provide flow augmentation for
salmon, and during the fall and winter to provide minimum
flows for bull trout. In addition, Libby has been operated to
provide flow augmentation for sturgeon. These fish flows
255. Id. at 34–35.
256. Id. at 35–37.
257. The FCOP does, however, provide that, “[c]onsistent with the Treaty and
Paragraph V of the Protocol Annex to Exchange of Notes, the United States Entity
may from time to time as conditions warrant adjust the flood control operation at
Libby Dam.” Id. at 32.
258. 16 U.S.C. § 1531 et seq. (2010).
259. Biological opinions (BiOps) prepared as part of federal agencies’ ESA
obligations (including the Bureau of Reclamation and the Corps) require operators of
federal dams to operate those facilities in ways which represent reasonable and
prudent alternatives to avoid jeopardy to a listed species or adverse modification of
critical habitat. For example, Libby is required to operate between May and June to
provide flows for sturgeon and between May and September for bull trout. U.S.
ENTITY, SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT, supra note 4 at 17. Additional aquatic species in
the Basin that are listed include Snake River Sockeye Salmon Evolutionary
Significant Unit (ESU), Upper Columbia River Chinook Salmon Spring-run ESU,
Upper Columbia River Steelhead ESU (all endangered), Snake River Chinook
Salmon Spring/Summer-run ESU, Snake River Chinook Salmon Fall-run ESU,
Lower Columbia River Chinook Salmon ESU, Upper Willamette River Chinook
Salmon ESU, Columbia River Chum Salmon ESU, Snake River Basin Steelhead
ESU, Lower Columbia River Steelhead ESU, Upper Willamette River Steelhead
ESU, Middle Columbia River Steelhead ESU (all threatened). Columbia River Basin
Fish Listed as Threatened or Endangered by NOAA Fisheries, LOWER COLUMBIA
RIVER ESTUARY PARTNERSHIP, http://www.lcrep.org/columbia-river-basin-fish-listedthreatened-or-endangered-noaa-fisheries.
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have exceeded the flows required under standard flood
control procedures and, as result, have adversely affected the
likelihood and frequency of refill at the various projects.260
Changes in Libby flows also resulted in claims by Canada
that the United States was in breach of its coordination
obligations under Article XII of the Treaty and paragraph 5
of the Protocol, resulting in downstream power losses at
Canadian dams on the Kootenay.261 The Parties reached a
settlement of this dispute through the terms of the Libby
Coordination Agreement.262
As a response to the problems identified in the previous
paragraph, and in an effort to provide both fish flows and
better assurance of refill, the Corps introduced the so-called
VARQ flood control procedure for both Libby and Hungry
Horse.263 In VARQ, “VAR” is shorthand for variable discharge
and “Q” stands for quantity.264 The operation was first
introduced through the Columbia River System Operation
Review in 1995265 and was recommended for implementation
in the Federal Columbia River Power System (FRPS)
Biological Opinion prepared by National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) fisheries266 and the
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service in 2000.267 While that BiOp
was superseded, VARQ continued to be implemented by the

260. U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, UPPER COLUMBIA ALTERNATIVE FLOOD CONTROL
FISH OPERATIONS FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT APPENDIX A
(2006), available at http://www.nws.usace.army.mil/PublicMenu/documents/VARQ/
UCEIS_AppA-ColumbiaBasinFloodControl.pdf [hereinafter APPENDIX A TO VARQ
FINAL EIS].
261. For further details on the background to this dispute see Bankes, supra note
6, at 89–92.

AND

262. LIBBY COORDINATION AGREEMENT RECORD OF DECISION, supra note 210.
263. See APPENDIX A TO VARQ FINAL EIS, supra note 260.
264. Id. at A-4.
265. The Columbia River System Operation Review (SOR) was conducted jointly
by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the Bureau of Reclamation, and the
Bonneville Power Administration. Of the fourteen Columbia River system hydro
projects that are the focus of the SOR, the Corps operates twelve and Reclamation
operates two. The review began in 1990 and was completed in 1995. Columbia River
System Operating Review, Selection of a System Operating Strategy (Record of
Decision), 62 Fed. Reg. 13,368 (Mar. 20, 1997),
266. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration is responsible for the
ESA with respect to anadromous fish (e.g., salmon).
267. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service is responsible for the ESA with respect to
resident fish (e.g., sturgeon).
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agencies.268 The Corps describes the result of applying VARQ
FC by contrast with standard FC as follows:269
VARQ procedures require less system flood control
space be made available prior to spring runoff and
allows outflows during refill to vary based on the
water supply forecast. . .
The basic premise of VARQ FC is that the outflows
during the refill period can vary and be higher than
minimum flows as based on the seasonal water supply
forecast (hence the name VARQ). Accordingly, if the
amount of water that is normally stored during the
refill period is instead passed through the project,
then the amount of storage space needed in the project
for flood control is reduced without compromising
system flood control. In years where the water supply
forecasts at Libby and Hungry Horse are expected to
be about 80% to 120% of average, the VARQ FC refill
outflow may be greater than minimum flows during
the refill period of May through July. Higher releases
during refill are a result of higher elevations at the
start of the refill period than would have been under
the Standard FC SRD. In years where the seasonal
runoff forecast is high . . ., VARQ FC storage space for
flood control and outflows during refill are the same
as Standard FC.
2012]

268. APPENDIX A TO VARQ FINAL EIS, supra note 260, at A-4.
269. Id. at A-5 to A-6 (alteration in original). A lengthy footnote to these
paragraphs notes that with water supply forecasts over 120% of average or between
sixty and eighty percent of actual operations from Libby would be essentially the
same under both VARQ FC and Standard FC due to physical constraints on dam
operation and limitations on Libby outflows as a result of the IJC’s Kootenay levels
Order of 1938. Id. The 1938 Order, Int’l J. Comm’n, 1938 Kootenay Lake Order (Nov.
11, 1938), available at http://www.ijc.org/rel/boards/Kootenay_
Lake/IJCOrder1938.pdf.
[R]equires an orderly draw down of Kootenay Lake in preparation for the spring
runoff such that the elevation not exceed 1739.32 feet on or about April 1 ….
During the high summer water, the allowable lake elevation is calculated using
the discharge from Kootenay Lake under original outlet conditions existing
before the excavation of Grohman Narrows. At the end of the summer to allow
farmers to work in their fields along the flood plain, the 1938 Order also
specifies that once the lake elevation falls below 1743.32 feet as measured at
the Nelson gage it should be held below this elevation until August 31. Between
September 1 and Jan. 7, the maximum elevation is 1745.32 feet.
Kootenay Lake Board of Control Responsibilities, INT’L KOOTENAY LAKE BOARD OF
CONTROL, http://www.ijc.org/conseil_board/kootenay_lake/en/kootenay_
mandate_mandat.htm (last update Nov. 1, 2011) (alteration in original).
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The Corps goes on to note that while fish flow operations
are not actually embedded in VARQ FC, VARQ FC “does
enable the operating agencies to more reliably supply spring
flow for fish in the Kootenai River immediately downstream
of the project. The assumption is that VARQ FC can provide
higher dam discharges required for conservation and
recovery of threatened and endangered species while
maintaining flood protection and improving the chance of
reservoir refill.”270
VARQ FC at Libby and Hungry Horse also has
implications for the operation of Grand Coulee. This
connection exists because VARQ FC may cause Libby and
Hungry Horse to be fuller at the end of April, thereby
curtailing the amount of upstream storage space available for
May. In order to provide adequate flood protection at The
Dalles, it may be necessary to provide an increased flood
control draft at Grand Coulee where water supply forecasts
are between 86% and 100% of average.271 There are also some
overall power system implications of VARQ but these do not
appear to be significant.272
III. THE COLUMBIA RIVER TREATY FLOOD CONTROL
OPERATING PLAN: ON CALL AND CALLED UPON
OPERATIONS (PRE- AND POST-2024)
We can now examine what little the FCOP has to say
about on-call and called upon operations. The storage
reservation diagrams (SRDs) for each of the Treaty projects,
do however, prescribe pool elevation for on-call storage.273 In
addition, the narrative in the FCOP for each project contains

270. APPENDIX A TO VARQ FINAL EIS, supra note 260, at A-7.
271. Id. at A-7 to A-8 (noting also that Reclamation and the Corps are co-leads on
the EIS precisely because operations at Libby (a Corps project) and at Hungry Horse
(Reclamation project) affect operations at Grand Coulee (Reclamation project)).
272. See U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, UPPER COLUMBIA ALTERNATIVE FLOOD
CONTROL AND FISH OPERATIONS FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT
APPENDIX J J-54 (2006), http://www.nws.usace.army.mil/PublicMenu/documents/
VARQ/UCEIS_AppJ-Power_Generation_benchmark_table_edit.pdf (indicating that
“for system generation, in comparing all VARQ to Standard Flood Control with and
without fish flows at Libby, VARQ reduces average annual system generation by 7
to 12 MW”). Neither the body of the EIS itself nor Appendix J addresses the
implications of VARQ for flood control operations at Canadian Treaty dams.
273. FCOP 2003, supra note 12, at charts 3–12.
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a paragraph on the on-call scenario. In some cases, this
paragraph is more specific than the general operating
conditions contained in Section X, (Implementation of the
Flood Control Operating Plan) of the FCOP.274 In order to get
a sense of how the Entities believe that the on-call
procedures will work, it is necessary to read together both
Section X of the FCOP and Appendix A, entitled “on-call
storage use.”
The two are not completely consistent. For example,
paragraph 10-5 of the FCOP provides that calls for the use of
on-call storage “shall be processed in accordance with” the
Protocol, with consideration for the need for on-call being
initiated as soon after January 1 as conditions indicate.275 In
contrast, Appendix A acknowledges that the procedural
safeguards of Section 1(3) of the Protocol mean that a twenty
day delay may be encountered before a request is honored
and that consequently (and given the discharge limitations of
each project276) “it will be necessary for consultations on the
use of on-call storage to commence in November in order to
be assured that the storage space at each project can be made
available by 1 April.”277 Thus, “[e]ven though official forecasts
which are used to prescribe the On-Call storage draft are not
available until January, On-Call drafting may need to begin
sooner with the mutual consent of both parties.”278
The Protocol is crystal clear, at least prior to 2024, in
prescribing that the United States cannot trigger the on-call
provisions unless potential flows in excess of 600, 000 cfs at
2012]

274. Id. at 38–41. For example, the provisions for Arrow state that “in years when
the unregulated volume of runoff at The Dalles is forecast to equal or exceed the
1894 flood runoff, and 7,100,000 acre-feet of storage space has been evacuated in
accordance with On-Call requirements, storage to elevation 1,446 feet will be
required to supply the necessary flood control storage. In years when the
unregulated volume of runoff is forecast to be less than 1894 flood runoff but greater
than normal in Canada, the Canadian Entity after consulting with the U.S. Entity
may use the additional storage between elevations 1,444 and 1,446 feet for flood
control in Canada.” Id. at 22. The surcharge referred to in the last sentence allows
Canada to use this space if necessary rather than evacuating a further 250,000 AF
of storage. Id. at 21.
275. FCOP 2003, supra note 12, at 39.
276. Discharge capacity is based on outlet valves, spillways (elevation dependent)
and generating capacity. The October 1972 FCOP Appendix A discusses these
variables in relation to Mica. FCOP 1972, supra note 12, at app. A.
277. FCOP 2003, supra note 12, at app. A.
278. Id.
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The Dalles is anticipated assuming the use of U.S. Storage
(existing or under construction in 1961).279 The ability to
anticipate such flows depends upon precipitation
measurements and runoff forecasts and the availability of
historical records of flows, with the need to adjust those
records to account for uncertainty and storage. The 2003
FCOP estimates that the total available storage (U.S. storage
as of 1961, Libby and primary treaty storage) should assure a
reduction of peak discharge at The Dalles in the case of a
major flood of about 300,000 cfs. Consequently, it should only
be necessary to trigger on call where flows in excess of
900,000 cfs are anticipated. Furthermore, starting with an
observation that unregulated peaks in excess of 900,000 cfs
have only occurred when April through August discharge
exceeds 120 maf and adjusting for errors and to take account
of the fact that forecasts become more precise as the season
progresses, Appendix A suggests that consultation on a call
should begin based on the following:280
Date of Forecast Forecast of Runoff Volume AF
1 January 105,000,000
1 February108,000,000
1 March 110,000,000
1 April 111,000,000
The 2003 FCOP also deals with compensation for on-call
storage (at least until 2024) referring first to Article VI of the
Treaty and then noting that:281
The agreed-to hydroelectric operating plans set out
the method for calculating the normal daily energy
outputs and capacity capabilities from Mica and
downstream projects in Canada during the period 1
January to 31 August. If the energy outputs and/or
capacity capabilities at Mica, and projects
downstream in Canada therefrom, fall below the
normal values during operation of On-Call storage,
the Operating Committee will arrange for hourly
279. The United States can call for On-Call storage to ensure that flows at The
Dalles do not exceed 600, 000 cfs. Due to uncertainties, this may require targeting a
lower flow.
280. FCOP 2003, supra note 12, at app. A, 40.
281. FCOP 2003, supra note 12, at 41.
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energy and/or capacity deliveries to be scheduled by
the U.S. Entity to the Canadian Entity to supplement
the electrical outputs from these projects. In addition,
if the Mica project fails to refill when On-Call storage
is utilized, the Canadian Entity will be entitled to
energy and/or capacity deliveries in the succeeding
operating year as described in the agreed-to
hydroelectric operating plans.
The FCOP has even less to say about how to operationalize
on-call or called upon storage after 2024. Indeed both the
1972 version and the 2003 version devote but one paragraph
to this distant scenario.282 The paragraph refers to Article
IV(3) of the Treaty, quotes Paragraph I(2) of the Protocol
(with its reference to the fact that “in no event shall Canada
be required to provide any greater degree of flood control
under Article IV(3) of the Treaty than that provided for
under Article IV(2) of the Treaty”) and then simply states
that “The operation of Canadian storage if called upon, will
be based on the same type of operation as established under
this Flood Control Operating Plan.”283 It is apparent that
much will need to be undertaken in order to make these
provisions work.
2012]

282. FCOP 1972, supra note 12, at 11; FCOP 2003, supra note 12, at 15.
283. Id.
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